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ABSTRACT 
In a static setting, willingness to pay (WTP) for an increase in quantity or quality is 
simply equal to the compensating variation, a Hicksian welfare measure. Likewise, willing­
ness to accept compensation in exchange (WTA) for a decrease in quantity or quality is equal 
to the equivalent variation. However, in a dynamic setting characterized by uncertainty, 
limited delay or reversal, and the potential for learning, these stated preference measures may 
also contain option values. Zhao and Kling (Economics Letters, 2001) use real options 
theory to explain the relationship between learning, irreversibility, and value formulation in a 
dynamic setting. In this dissertation, I discuss the design and results of two empirical tests of 
whether stated preference value measures are affected by dynamic aspects of the market 
environment, and whether those effects, if they exist, are consistent with Zhao and Kling's 
predictions. 
The first test incorporates the dynamic nature of the value formulation process into a 
contingent valuation study designed to measure the value local residents place on a north-
central Iowa lake. My results show that WTP is highly sensitive to the potential for future 
learning. Respondents offered the opportunity to delay their purchasing decisions until more 
information became available were willing to pay significantly less for improved water 
quality than were those facing a now-or-never decision. These results suggest that welfare 
analysts should take care to accurately represent the potential for future learning. 
The second test also deals with the effects of learning and irreversibility on stated 
preference measures, but this time in an experimental economic setting. I test whether part 
of the disparity observed between WTA and WTP in the experimental economic literature 
can be explained by the presence of real options. To do this, I have performed a series of 
experimental treatments designed to analyze the effect subjects' perceptions regarding the 
relative difficulty of reversal and delay have on their valuation of a private good. While I 
find some evidence that subjects do take into account dynamic considerations, I cannot show 
that WTA and WTP are affected in a manner consistent with Zhao and Kling's theory. 
(JEL: D60, Q26, C42, C91) 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Hicksian welfare theory forms the foundation of modern welfare analysis. Though 
simple and undeniably elegant, this theory is also static. Using it to perform empirical 
welfare analysis in a dynamic environment, therefore, ignores key aspects of the value 
formulation process, and can result in either over- or underestimation of welfare change. If 
we are to have any confidence in our ability to perform reliable benefit-cost analysis, it is 
crucial that we better understand the factors affecting value formulation in a dynamic setting. 
Hicksian theory's most basic components, compensating and equivalent variation, are 
used extensively in empirical demand studies, stated preference surveys, and experimental 
laboratory settings. The popularity of these measures follows from their equivalence, in a 
static setting, with what agents are willing to pay or accept in compensation for changes in 
price or quality. However, in an explicitly dynamic setting characterized by uncertainty, 
potential future learning, and limited reversibility or delay, the equivalence between stated 
preference measures and their underlying Hicksian variations breaks down. Although static 
Hicksian theory has little to say about how the potential arrival of new information and the 
ability to reverse or delay a transaction might affect stated values, recent work by Zhao and 
Kling (2001, 2002) systematically investigates the impact these dynamic issues have on the 
formation of willingness to pay (WTP) and willingness to accept (WTA). 
Zhao and Kling show that if a potential buyer is uncertain about the actual value of 
the good she is interested in purchasing, there is an option value associated with delaying the 
transaction if more information regarding the good's value can be gained by waiting. There­
fore, in order to commit to purchase today and forgo future learning opportunities, the agent 
must be compensated by being offered a lower price than the one she would have been 
willing to pay were future learning not an option. On the other hand, if the agent is uncertain 
about the future market value of the good, there is an option value associated with purchasing 
the good today, as this may allow her to sell the good for a profit in the future. Taking into 
account this potential for future profit, the agent would be willing to pay a higher price than 
would have been the case were future selling not an option. Zhao and Kling call the net 
effect of these two option values the commitment cost. This concept is parallel to the quasi 
option value developed by Arrow and Fisher (1974), and Henry (1974). In this dynamic 
setting, WTP and WTA are comprised not simply of the expected surplus from consuming 
the good, but also include a pair of opposing option values. Thus, depending on the situation, 
WTP for an improvement may either over- or understate compensating variation. The same 
is true for WTA and equivalent variation. 
If the commitment cost is sufficiently large, Zhao and Kling's theory may provide in­
sight into several critical issues related to welfare measurement. For example, the theory 
may be particularly important in gaining a better understanding of the use of stated prefer­
ence techniques to gauge the value of nonmarket goods in a dynamic setting. While contin­
gent markets for goods such as environmental quality are generally thought of as static, it is 
possible that there are dynamic elements present in these studies' willingness to pay esti­
mates. Ignoring these dynamic elements may lead to misunderstanding and misstatement of 
value estimates. The commitment cost theory could help determine the appropriate type and 
amount of information to provide in valuation exercises, and, even more fundamentally, the 
appropriate definition of the welfare measures for benefit-cost assessment under uncertainty. 
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While careful empirical research has been undertaken concerning the effects key estimation 
choices have on environmental valuation (see, for example, Carson et al. 1997, 1998), the 
effects due to the dynamic formation of WTP values have not been studied. 
Another area where a better understanding of dynamic value formation may prove 
useful is in interpreting the often-observed disparity between WTA and WTP. Economic 
laboratory experiments and CVM studies consistently find that individuals asked for their 
minimum willingness to accept compensation in order to give up a good report values several 
times higher than had they been asked for their maximum willingness to pay for the very 
same good (see Horowitz and McConnell 2000a for a comprehensive discussion of this 
literature). Previous theories attempting to explain this apparent anomaly have primarily 
treated the problem as static (e.g., Tversky and Kahneman 1990, Hanemann 1991). Little 
work has been done where the disparity is considered in a dynamic context. Zhao and Kling 
(2001) show that, under certain dynamic conditions, the existence of commitment costs can 
cause WTA to exceed WTP, thus reconciling the observed disparity with neoclassical 
consumer theory. The authors cite several studies that offer "intriguing empirical support" 
for their theory, but note that none of these studies were specifically designed to test whether 
commitment costs contribute to WTA-WTP disparity. 
My goal in this dissertation is, first, to test whether stated preference measures elic­
ited in settings traditionally thought of as static actually contain significant dynamic compo­
nents, and, second, to test if these dynamic components are sufficiently large to warrant a 
rethinking of the static methods that currently form the basis of empirical welfare measure­
ment. 
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In Chapter 2,1 present a review of the relevant literature. I begin by discussing the 
real options literature, which forms the basis of the commitment cost model. I also review 
the literature from two of the areas where a better understanding of the dynamic aspects of 
the decision problem could have the most meaningful implications. The first of these is the 
contingent valuation method, which is used extensively in nonmarket valuation. The second 
area of interest is the often-observed disparity between WTA and WTP. 
In Chapter 3,1 develop a theoretical model of WTA and WTP formation under dy­
namic conditions. I am able to formulate an explicit representation of the commitment cost. 
This allows for a better understanding of the factors that affect its magnitude, and thus makes 
it possible to test for the existence of commitment costs in contingent and experimental 
markets. 
In Chapter 4,1 develop an empirical specification of dynamic WTP derived directly 
from neoclassical consumer theory. I then use this to test whether the opportunity to delay 
the decision to "purchase" improved environmental quality significantly affects WTP in a 
CVM setting. My findings show that WTP is highly sensitive to the potential for future 
learning. Respondents faced with an explicitly static, now-or-never decision were willing to 
pay significantly more for improved water quality than those offered the opportunity to delay 
their purchasing decisions until more information became available. 
In Chapter 5,1 report the results of two economic experiments designed to test 
whether dynamic considerations affect WTP and WTA in a controlled laboratory setting, and 
whether this might explain the disparity observed in the experimental literature. I do this 
both by controlling subjects' information regarding the difficulty associated with reversing 
and delaying transactions outside of the experimental market, and by controlling the diffi­
culty of reversal and delay within the experimental market itself. By comparing the values 
reported in these different experimental treatments with subjects' beliefs about the relative 
difficulty of delay and reversal, I find limited support for the idea that values formed in an 
experimental setting include dynamic components. However, I do not find evidence that 
suggests these dynamic components contribute significantly to the WTA-WTP disparity. 
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CHAPTER 2 
A REVIEW OF THE RELEVANT LITERATURE 
The commitment cost model can be thought of as an extension of the larger real 
options literature. As such, in Section 2.1 I provide background on the real options analysis 
that forms the basis of the theoretical commitment cost model I describe in Chapter 3. This 
is followed in Section 2.2 by a discussion of the contingent valuation method (CVM), which 
is the stated preference technique I use in Chapter 4 to test for the existence of dynamic 
component in willingness to pay. One of the more interesting results that follows from the 
commitment cost model is that, under certain circumstances, the often observed disparity 
between what an individual is willing to accept (WTA) in exchange for good and what she is 
willing to pay (WTP) for the same good can be explained within the context of neoclassical 
economic theory. In Chapter 5,1 present the results of an experimental economic test of 
whether this in fact the case. Therefore, in Section 2.3 I discuss several theories that have 
been proposed in an effort to explain this apparent anomaly and the results from some of the 
relevant empirical literature. 
2.1 THE REAL OPTIONS LITERATURE 
The theory of commitment cost is an extension of the real options literature. The 
original concept of option value, as introduced by Weisbrod (1964), is today viewed essen­
tially as a risk premium. Commitment cost, on the other hand, is more closely related to 
quasi-option value, which may exist even under risk neutral preferences. 
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In his 1962 work Capitalism and Freedom, Friedman draws a distinction between 
municipal parks, which serve as public goods, and national parks, which, in his view, do not. 
Based on this dichotomy, Friedman contends that if a national park such as Yellowstone 
cannot cover its costs through entry fees, it should be opened up to commercial development 
by the highest bidder. In response to this argument, Weisbrod points out that individuals 
who may never visit Yellowstone would be willing to pay to preserve the option of one day 
making the trip. This willingness to pay, now known as option value, would be impossible to 
capture through entry fees. Thus, Weisbrod concludes that it is likely in the interest of 
efficiency to maintain national parks even when their entry receipts do not cover their costs. 
Hanemann (1989) divides the options literature that has followed from Weisbrod's 
original work into two categories. The first includes what is sometimes referred to as the 
Schmalensee-Bohm-Graham (SBG) option value. This option value follows directly from 
Weisbrod's early work and is, in essence, a risk premium. It represents the amount that a 
risk-averse agent would pay ex ante to be assured access to the good at some point in the 
future. While this value may be positive or negative depending on the nature of the agent's 
preferences, it can only be non-zero if the agent is risk averse. While the earliest formal 
work on this topic was performed by Cicchetti and Freeman (1971) and was refined and 
extended by Schmalensee (1972), and Bohm (1975) among others, Graham (1981) seems to 
have framed things most clearly. He developed what he calls the "WTP locus"—the set of ex 
post payment packages that hold ex ante utility constant. Graham shows that option price 
and expected consumer surplus are, in fact, just two different points along the WTP locus. 
Hanemann's second category includes the quasi-option value developed by Arrow 
and Fisher (1974), and Henry (1974). As the name suggests, quasi-option value (QOV) bears 
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some resemblance to the SBG option value in that both are measures of the value placed on 
future access to a resource in the face of uncertainty. However, QOV is more broad in that it 
can be non-zero even when agents are risk neutral. This is because QOV takes into account 
not only uncertainty but also the irreversibility of development and the resulting asymmetry 
of the development decision.1 This asymmetry arises because the decision to preserve a 
resource in the current period can be reversed in the future by developing at that point. On 
the other hand, the decision to develop in the current period cannot be reversed in the future 
since the landscape has been irreparably altered. As Hanemann points out, QOV is the 
conditional value of perfect information—conditional, that is, on the resource being pre­
served today. An agent who takes these issues into account will pursue less development 
today than a naive agent. QOV can also be thought of as the shadow tax that induces the 
efficient level of development from a naive agent. Further theoretical work related to QOV 
has been done by Conrad (1980), Viscusi (1988), Hanemann (1989) and Usategui (1990), 
among others. 
A number of empirical studies have attempted to measure option value. These studies 
focus mainly on the magnitude of the SBG option value relative to expected consumer 
surplus (for example, Brookshire, Eubanks, and Randall 1983; Smith, Desvousges, and 
Fisher 1983; Walsh, Loomis, and Gillman 1984; and Edwards 1988). While such studies 
have generally concluded that the SBG option value is positive, their findings on its magni­
tude relative to expected consumer surplus have varied widely. In contrast, little empirical 
work has been published on the magnitude of QOV relative to expected consumer surplus. 
An exception is the work on mining development by Greenley, Walsh, and Young (1981), 
1 Dixit and Pindyck's ( 1994) "option value" corresponds to what I refer to as "quasi-option value." 
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though their survey design and theoretical underpinnings have been criticized (see Brook­
shire, Eubanks, and Randall; Freeman 1984; Mitchell and Carson 1989; and Hanemann 
1989). 
2.2 THE CONTINGENT VALUATION METHOD 
An area where commitment cost theory is particularly relevant is environmental 
valuation. The contingent valuation method (CVM) enjoys widespread use within the 
environmental valuation literature, where it is generally accepted that there are certain types 
of nonmarket goods whose value can only be estimated using CVM or other similar stated 
preference techniques. However, CVM remains controversial among economists at large due 
to questions concerning the method's reliability. Chief among these is the concern that CVM 
estimates of WTP may overstate respondents' "true" valuation. 
Originally developed by Davis (1963), Mitchell and Carson (1989) describe CVM as 
using survey questions to elicit respondents' preferences by estimating their willingness to 
pay for specified improvements in a nonmarket good. Respondents are typically presented 
with a survey instrument made up of three parts: (1) a detailed description of the good being 
valued and the hypothetical circumstances under which it will made available to them, (2) 
questions eliciting respondents' willingness to pay for the good, and (3) questions about the 
respondents' socioeconomic characteristics. 
The importance of CVM is underscored by Executive orders 12044, 12291, and 
12866 issued by Presidents Carter, Reagan, and Clinton, respectively. Each order requires 
federal agencies to consider both the costs and benefits of potential regulatory actions. But 
the importance of CVM was brought to the forefront by the Exxon Valdez oil spill along 
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Alaska's Prince William Sound in March 1989, which lead to the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 
and the subsequent NOAA Panel report on the reliability of CVM as a means of assessing 
legal damages (Arrow et al. 1993). 
In its report, the NOAA Panel details a number of guidelines that it believes are im­
portant to assuring the reliability of value estimates used to assess legal damages. Portney 
(1994) breaks these into seven distinct points: (1) personal interviews are preferable to phone 
interviews, which are preferable to mail surveys, (2) studies should elicit estimates of WTP 
even when WTA is the theoretically correct welfare measure, (3) valuation questions should 
not be open ended but should be posed as referenda, (4) the proposed program must be 
described in a way that is understandable and accurate, (5) respondents must be reminded of 
their budget constraints, (6) respondents must be informed of the existence of substitute 
goods, and (7) valuation questions should be followed up by a question ensuring that respon­
dents understand the response they have just given. 
CVM's primary appeal is its flexibility. This allows for the valuation of goods as var­
ied as increased visibility (Rowe, d'Arge, and Brookshire 1980), mortality risk reduction 
(Krupnick et al. 2002), and the existence value of endangered species (Ekstrand and Loomis 
1998). By creating a hypothetical market where no real market exists, CVM allows econo­
mists to estimate values (e.g., nonuse, bequest, and option values) that would be difficult, if 
not impossible, to estimate using revealed preference techniques. 
However, the flexibility afforded by CVM's hypothetical nature is often viewed as 
one of its principal drawbacks. Some economists suggest that the hypothetical nature of the 
questions and the lack of market discipline introduce what has come to be called "hypotheti­
cal bias" (Cummings et al. 1997). Hypothetical bias refers to respondents' tendency to be 
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more generous when answering hypothetical willingness to pay questions than when the 
proposed payment is real. 
Whether hypothetical bias does in fact pose a major problem is an empirical question. 
Carson et al. (1996) reexamine eighty-three studies where both CVM and revealed prefer­
ence value estimates are reported. They show that CVM estimates are, on average, less than 
revealed preference estimates, which are generally considered to be less controversial. 
Likewise, Cummings and Taylor (1999) find that explicit warnings can eliminate hypotheti­
cal bias for a variety of public goods. In a similar study, List (2001) finds the same result 
among amateur sportscard traders (however, he finds that hypothetical bias persists among 
professional dealers). 
2.3 THE WTA-WTP DISPARITY LITERATURE 
Under certain circumstances, the commitment cost model may explain the frequently 
observed disparity between the minimum amount an agent is willing to accept in exchange 
for a good (WTA) and the maximum she is willing to pay (WTP) for it. Studies as early as 
that by Coombs, Bezembinder, and Goode in 1967 have consistently found that stated WTA 
is several times higher than WTP for the very same good, and the disparity between the two 
value measures appears to hold for many types of goods (see Horowitz and McConnell 2000a 
for a review of over 200 experiments dealing with WTA-WTP disparity). A number of 
explanations for this apparent anomaly have been put forward. These explanations can be 
put into two broad categories: behavioral arguments that borrow heavily from the psychology 
literature, and neoclassical arguments that attempt to explain the disparity by extending 
neoclassical utility theory. 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) were the first to suggest a behavioral approach. Their 
prospect theory represents an alternative to expected utility theory. Under prospect theory 
probabilities are assigned decision weights, and changes in welfare due to gains or losses are 
defined relative to an agent's initial endowment. In this way, the authors argue that an 
agent's preferences are reference dependent and that potential losses figure more prominently 
in the agent's mind than do potential gains. They later adapted this model to explain WTA-
WTP disparity (Tversky and Kahneman 1991). Thaler (1980) also builds upon the prospect 
theory model. He points out that individual behavior is consistently at odds with the predic­
tions of traditional economic theory, and goes on to use prospect theory to explain a number 
of "economic mental allusions," including the endowment effect. 
The endowment effect has been the focus of dozens of empirical studies.2 One par­
ticularly elegant test was performed by Knetsch (1989). An initial set of subjects was offered 
the choice between a coffee mug and a candy bar. The result was a fairly even split: 56% of 
subjects chose the mug, and the remainder chose the candy bar. In the later treatments, 
different subjects were endowed with either the mug or the candy bar and then were offered 
the option to trade for the other good. Given this choice, only 11% of subjects initially 
endowed with the mug and just 10% of those initially endowed with the candy bar were 
interested in the trade. 
Loomes and Sugden (1982) develop a different framework that they claim is consis­
tent with the predictions of prospect theory, but is also simpler and more intuitive. Their 
theory can best be understood by considering a simple example. Suppose an agent must 
2 See Thaler, Kahneman, and Knetsch ( 1992) for examples. Also see Brookshire and Coursey ( 1987) for 
comparisons of economic and psychological studies of the endowment effect. 
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consider two courses of action: a, and a 2 .  Further, suppose the future is characterized by 
two possible states of the world: S/ that occurs with probability p, and Sj that occurs with 
probability (1 - p). The consequence associated with action i in state j is denoted xy. The 
authors argue that given the agent chooses action a,, utility depends not only on consequence 
Xy, but also on x k j , the consequence that would have been realized had the agent initially 
chosen action a k .  If consequence xtj is preferred over xkj, the agent rejoices and derives 
greater utility from x& than would have been the case had it simply been imposed upon her. 
Conversely, if consequence x k j  is preferred over x t j ,  the agent experiences regret and derives 
less utility from x- than had it been imposed upon her. Regret aversion can be used to 
explain why an agent offered the opportunity to buy a good is willing to pay strictly less than 
that good's expected value, whereas had the same agent been initially endowed with the 
good, her willingness to accept compensation in exchange for it would be strictly more than 
its expected value. 
Loomes, S tanner, and Sugden (1992) test the predictions of regret theory in an ex­
perimental setting, and are able to support only some of them. Namely, regret theory predicts 
violations of the assumptions of monotonicity (i.e., that stochastically dominant prospects are 
preferred to those they dominate) and equivalence (i.e., that if two lotteries can be repre­
sented by the same prospects, subjects should be indifferent between the two). While the 
authors are able to show that subjects' choices frequently violate monotonicity, they cannot 
show that subjects' choices violate equivalence. 
While these behavioral theories are compelling, their findings are fundamentally at 
odds with standard, neoclassical consumer theory. In contrast, Heiner (1983), Hoehn and 
Randall (1987), Hanemann (1991), and Zhao and Kling (2001) provide explanations based 
firmly upon neoclassical theory. Heiner bases his argument on what he calls the "compe­
tence-difficulty gap." This gap refers to the difference between the cognitive wherewithal 
required to solve a decision problem and that actually possessed by the agent. While most 
economic analysis implicitly assumes the C-D gap is zero, Heiner suggests that agents are 
not always up to the optimization task. The existence of such a gap would introduce addi­
tional uncertainty into the problem, resulting in greater uncertainty surrounding the value of 
the good in question. This, in turn, results in an increase in reported WTA and a decrease in 
reported WTP. 
Hoehn and Randall tell a similar story, developing what they call the "value formula­
tion problem." They assert that the formulation of stated benefit measures is subject to two 
types of error: that due to imperfect information and that due to time constraints. Imperfect 
information arises when survey designers try to convey complex policy issues to a respon­
dent. Misunderstanding or miscommunication of these issues leads to greater uncertainty 
regarding a good's value. Given perfect information, the authors define CV and EV as 
CV = m-e(p,q\u°)  and EV = e(p,q° ,u l ) -m,  (2.1) 
where e( ) is the expenditure function, m is income, p is a vector of prices, q° and ql are the 
quantities of the public good before and after the implementation of some proposed policy, 
and u° and ul are the agent's utility before and after implementation. Imperfect information 
is characterized by introducing the uncertainty term D as follows: 
15 
CV = m-e(p,q\u°;D) and EV = e(p,q° ,u l ;D)-m.  (2.2) 
This uncertainty raises the expenditure necessary to achieve u° in the CV case and ul in the 
EV case. The result, as in Heiner's model, is an increase in reported WTA and a decrease in 
reported WTP. Similarly, placing constraints on the time a respondent has to consider 
valuation questions cuts short her utility maximization process and leads to increased dispar­
ity between reported WTA and reported WTP. 
Hanemann provides an explanation of the disparity based on a reinterpretation of 
Randall and Stoll's (1980) result. He suggests that, even in the face of small income effects, 
the difference between WTA and WTP resulting from a change in the quantity of a non-
market good can still be large if that good has few substitutes. More specifically, the diver­
gence between the reported benefit measures depends inversely upon the elasticity of substi­
tution. Thus, for goods with few substitutes, Hanemann is able to reconcile the observed 
disparity with neoclassical consumer theory. 
Empirical work by Shogren, Shin, Hayes, and Kliebenstein (1994, henceforth SSHK) 
lends support to Hanemann's theory. SSHK show that when subjects are repeatedly exposed 
to second-price sealed bid auctions for a private good with many substitutes (candy), WTA 
and WTP tend to converge. Though, when the authors use the same auction mechanism to 
value a private good with only poor substitutes (the subjects' own health), the disparity is 
persistent. 
Although compelling, these results still fail to explain why other well-designed stud­
ies consistently find disparity between WTP and WTA for all types of goods. More recent 
studies such as those by Shogren and Hayes (1996) and Knetsch, Tang, and Thaler (2001, 
henceforth KTT) cast some doubt on SSHK's findings. Shogren and Hayes repeat the 
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experiment originally performed by SSHK, but instead use the demand revealing Becker-
DeGroot-Marschak (1964) auction mechanism with randomly determined market prices. 
Under this framework, the authors do not observe convergence of stated benefit measures for 
goods with many substitutes. KTT go on to suggest that the convergence found in SSHK's 
original experiments may be due in part to the auction mechanism used. KTT replicate the 
original experiments using both second- and ninth-price sealed bid auctions. While in the 
second-price case they find that repeated trials lead to convergence of WTA and WTP bids 
for goods with many substitutes, in the ninth-price treatment disparity actually increases. In 
a one-shot setting, both of these Vickrey (1961) auction mechanisms are theoretically de­
mand revealing. KTT's results suggest that the auctions may lose their demand revealing 
property when repeated with market feedback.3 
Horowitz and McConnell (2000b) cast further doubt on Hanemann's theory, making 
use of a reinterpretation of his work. Using a technique first suggested by Sugden (1999), the 
authors estimate the WTA/WTP ratio as a function of the income effect. Specifically, they 
use a first-order Taylor series approximation to write WTA as 
ÔWTP WTA * WTP + WTA , (2.3) 
dm 
where m represents income, implying 
ÔWTP , WTP 
wfÂ'  (24)  
Horowitz and McConnell point out that in order to explain the two-to-one WTA/WTP ratios 
commonly observed for private goods, the change in an agent's willingness to pay with 
respect to a change in income would have to be one half. Put loosely, given a $100 lump-
See Kolstad and Guzman (1999) and Shogren et al. (2001a) for further discussion of this issue. 
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sum increase in income immediately prior to such an experiment, the consumer would be 
expected to allocate $50 of it toward the purchase of the good for sale. In this light, the ten-
to-one ratios observed in contingent markets for public environmental goods seem even less 
plausible. The authors conclude that the "ratio of WTA to WTP is too high to be consistent 
with neoclassical preferences." 
More recently, Zhao and Kling (2001) have suggested a real options analysis. They 
propose that, given uncertainty, irreversibility, and learning over time, the value of a good is 
affected not just by its intrinsic worth but also by an option value. That is, given that an 
agent is uncertain about the actual value of a good she wishes to buy or sell and that more 
information can be gained by waiting, delaying the transaction may be desirable. Therefore, 
in order to make the transaction now and forgo future learning opportunities, the agent must 
be compensated by being offered either a higher price if she is a seller or a lower price if she 
is a buyer. In other words, in the presence of uncertainty, irreversibility, and learning, WTA 
is higher and WTP is lower than would be the case if one or more of these conditions were 
not met. This explanation allows for the gap in reported benefit measures to persist for both 
private and public goods so long as an agent still stands to gain information by waiting. 
Further, commitment cost can explain WTA-WTP disparity for goods with many substitutes, 
even in the absence of endowment effects. 
All of the empirical studies discussed in this section use experimental economics. 
While I will not attempt to survey that field here (see Roth 1995 for an excellent review), it is 
worth noting that, while still not accepted by all economists, experimental methods have 
been having an increasing impact on the larger economic literature. In their primer on the 
design of economic experiments, Friedman and Sunder (1994) concede that economics has 
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traditionally been viewed as a non-experimental discipline such as meteorology or astron­
omy. Like these non-experimental disciplines, empirical work in economics has focused on 
observing phenomena that occur naturally in the marketplace. They note, however, that over 
recent decades there has been growing interest in testing economic theory in a controlled 
experimental environment. In his review of the experimental literature, Roth notes that since 
Thurstone's (1931) early work using experimental techniques to study the shape of indiffer­
ence curves, the number of paper published in experimental economics has grown exponen­
tially each decade. Holt's (1999) bibliography of the experimental literature cites 2000 
publications and some 500 working papers in the field. 
THE COMMITMENT COST MODEL 
In order to fully understand the concept of commitment cost and appreciate its policy 
implications, it is necessary to formalize the concept. In this chapter, I develop four models 
of commitment cost under different conditions. The model developed in Section 3.1 applies 
to non-durable goods and is useful in understanding the role agents' perceptions of the 
institutional structure of the market play in the formation of the option values that eventually 
determine the sign and magnitude of the commitment cost. This is the model that I will refer 
to in the experimental economic test of commitment cost presented in Chapter 5. 
The model presented in Section 3.2 is similar to that in Section 3.1, though it extends 
the concept of commitment cost to the market for a durable good. The model presented in 
Section 3.3 imposes restrictions on the durable good model in a way that will allow me to test 
for the existence of commitment cost in a contingent market for environmental quality. The 
design and results of this test are presented in Chapter 4. 
Finally, the model presented in Section 3.4 extends that from Section 3.3 by making it 
more consistent with the ecological realities of procrastination. Specifically, I allow the 
status quo level of environmental quality to deteriorate as the agent delays her decision about 
whether to pursue a proposed project to improve environmental quality, and I allow the cost 
of the proposed improvement to rise as the environment continues to decline. 
20 
3.1 Real Options and the Disparity Between Expected and Stated Values 
Given that a potential buyer is uncertain about the actual value of a good she is 
interested in buying, that there are costs associated with either reversing or delaying the 
transaction, and that more information regarding the good's value can be attained by waiting, 
then there are option values associated with both delay and immediate action. Waiting may 
allow the potential buyer to avoid a transaction that would yield negative surplus. Therefore, 
in order to commit to the purchase now and forgo future learning opportunities, the agent 
must be compensated by being offered a lower price than the one she would have been 
willing to pay in the absence of future learning. However, there is also an option value 
associated with buying today, since that may allow the agent to sell the good for a profit at 
some future date. Thus, the agent's willingness to pay in a dynamic setting is not simply a 
function of the good's intrinsic value, but is also a function these options values. 
A potential seller is in a similar situation. If there exists uncertainty about a good's 
value, if the agent perceives there to be costs associated with reversal or delay, and if she 
stands to gain more information by waiting, then, as before, there are option values associ­
ated with both selling immediately and delaying the selling decision. It may be in her best 
interest to delay the transaction until more information becomes available. In order to 
commit to the transaction today, she will demand greater compensation in exchange for the 
good than would have been the case in a static setting. Likewise, there is also an incentive to 
sell today as the good's future price may be lower than the price it commands today. 
Kling, List, and Zhao (2001) develop a simple model incorporating the paired option 
values associated with any transaction made in a dynamic, uncertain setting. The first of 
these option values is associated with purchasing the good today. If an agent purchases a 
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good in the current period, there is the potential that she will be able to sell it for a profit at 
some point in the future. This option value can be written as 
where v ~[v,v] is the agent's valuation of the good, c™y is the perceived cost of selling later 
(i.e., reversing the purchase), R ~ [R, /?] is the good's market price, and £(•) is the expecta­
tion over v and R. For simplicity, the authors assume the true values of v and R will be 
revealed in the second of two periods. 
The second option value is associated with delaying the purchasing decision. If the 
agent does not purchase the good today, there is the chance that she will be able to purchase 
it in the future at a lower price. This option value can be written as 
where v and R are defined as before, and cdb„y is the perceived cost of buying in the second 
period (i.e., delaying the purchase). 
Which of these option values is greater depends on the good's market price, the 
perceived costs of purchasing or selling the item in the future, and the agent's own valuation 
of the good. Kling et al. show that if a potential buyer perceives the cost of selling later c% 
to be greater than the cost of buying later , OV™ will be greater than OV™, and WTP in 
the current period will be less than the good's expected value £(v) : 
(3.1) 
(3.2) 
»7? = £(v) + OÇ-OÇ. (3.3) 
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A similar story can be told for the potential seller. If the seller believes that the cost 
of the buying later c™ will be greater than the cost of selling later c*', OVs*' will be greater 
than OV™, and WTA in the current period will be greater than the good's expected value: 
WTA = £(v) - Or,7 +Or*', (3.4) 
where OV% = E(v-R-cZ | v > * + <£ ) and OV*' = E(R - v-c% | v< * -e£). 
Thus, the theory predicts that if, on average, both buyers and sellers perceive the cost 
associated with reversing a transaction to be greater than the cost associated with delaying it, 
the option value associated with delay will be greater than the option value associated with 
reversal, implying WTP < £(v) < WTA. This may seem counterintuitive since reversal for a 
buyer and delay for a seller both involve essentially the same transaction: selling the good in 
the future. However, the authors go on to point out that if only one of the two groups, buyers 
or sellers, believes that reversing is more difficult than delay, but the other group's beliefs are 
such that the relationship OV™ + OV™ > OV™ + OV™ still holds, the model still predicts 
that WTA will be greater than WTP. 
3.2 Commitment Cost in the Market for a Durable Good 
In this section, I extend the previous section's analysis to the market for a durable 
good, the benefits from which can be enjoyed in both periods of a two-period model. This 
will be useful in Chapter 4 where I analyze the effects of delay and uncertainty on the 
valuation of environmental quality, a durable good. Similar to Zhao and Kling (2000), I 
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begin by assuming the agent's utility function is time separable and defined over per-period 
income m, and consumption of a durable good g,. That is, 
u(m x ,g x )  +Pu(m z ,g 2 ) ,  (3.5) 
where [5 is the discount factor. A single unit of the durable good G can be purchased in 
period one, period two, or not at all. If G is purchased in period one, it can be enjoyed in 
period two at  no addi t ional  cost .  For  s implici ty ,  I  wil l  assume away income smoothing;  i f  G 
is purchased in period t at price p, mt will be reduced by p, and income in the other period 
will be unaffected.1 I also assume m x=m 2=m, and I normalize the status quo level of 
durable good consumption to zero. 
In this model, the agent is uncertain about the utility she would receive from G.2 Her 
beliefs regarding G are represented by the distribution function F0(G) and the corresponding 
density /0(G) on [G,G], where G > 0. 
In the absence of learning, the agent's decision is simply whether to buy in the current 
period or never to buy. While I assume the learning-constrained agent recognizes that 
benefits from purchasing G in the current period are also enjoyed in the future, I assume that 
she does not realize that delaying her purchasing decision may allow her to avoid a "bad 
purchase" (i.e., a purchase that yields negative surplus). Thus, in the absence of learning, the 
agent's willingness to pay wtpSL is the critical price pNL such that the she is indifferent 
between purchasing the durable good in the current period and never purchasing it. That is, 
Ec (u (m - pNL, G) + Pu (m, G)) = (1 + P)u (m, 0), (3.6) 
1 Zhao and Kling (2002) show this assumption reduces the magnitude of the commitment cost. 
2 In the next section I will extend the model to the case where the agent is uncertain about the quality of g she 
would enjoy if she were to go ahead with the purchase. 
24 
where the NL superscript indicates no-leaming. 
If the agent can learn more about G in the second period, the problem becomes more 
interesting. I assume learning comes by way of a signal arriving in period two that provides 
the agent with more information about her value of G. I denote that signal as s  e S c R, 
where S is the set of all possible signals. Conditional on the true value of G, the distribution 
of the signal is described by the conditional density function hs[G (s). The unconditional 
density function for j is h(s)  = j7«I|G (,s)</F0(G) . Observing s ,  the agent updates her beliefs 
about  G according to  Bayes '  rule:  fQ s  (G) = h^G (s) / 0  (G) /  h(s) .  
If the agent purchases G in the first period, she can sell it in the second after observ­
ing s by incurring a reversal cost c™y. Likewise, if the agent delays the purchasing decision, 
she can purchase G in period two but will incur a delay cost cb'Jy. 
Let Vb™(p, s) be the agent's expected gain from purchasing G in the first period, but 
then selling in the second after observing s: 
+ /> -<,-0)-"(m,G))tf-Q(G). (3.7) 
Having observed s, the agent will exercise her option to sell in period two if and only if 
Vb% (P> s) > 0. Let S% = [s e S : Vb™ (p,s) > o} be the set of signals that will induce the 
agent to sell in the second period. Further, let EUX  denote the agent's expected utility if she 
purchases G in the current period: 
££/,  = Eau(m -  p,G) + PVti.SZ)u(m + p-c£,0) 
+^(1 -Pr(SC))f« Mes-), 
where p is the price of G, and Pr( S™y ) is the probability of observing a signal J e Srb™. 
By delaying the purchasing decision, the agent retains the option to purchase in the 
second period. Let V^(p,s) be the agent's expected gain from purchasing G after observ­
ing s : 
J(«,(m-p-<,G)-u3(m,G„))rfFa(G). (3.9) 
Having observed s, the agent will exercise her option to purchase G if and only if 
V^,(p,s) > 0. Let Sf* = | j€ S : V*y (p,s) > o| be the set of signals that will induce the 
agent to purchase G in the second period. Further, let EU2 represent the agent's expected 
utility from delaying the purchasing decision: 
EU,=u,(m,O) + /3Vi{S%)E a (u , (m -p ,G)\szS%) + 0(i-?r(SZ))u,(m,O).  (3.10) 
The learning agent's willingness to pay wtpL  is the critical price pL  at which she is 
indifferent between purchasing in the first period and delaying the purchasing decision until 
period two. pL can be solved for implicitly by equating formulas (3.8) and (3.10). 
Zhao and Kling (2001, 2002) define the commitment cost CC as the difference 
between wtpSL and wtpL. The sign of CC is ambiguous when the agent is presented with 
both reversal and delay options. However, in the next section I show that strict irreversibility 
implies that CC is positive. 
The potential seller's problem is very similar. Her expected utility from selling in 
period one is 
26 
EU, =u(m + p,O) + 0P^S™)E a (u(m-p-c%,G)\seSZ) 
x 
' (3.11) 
+/?(l-Pr(S~))u(m,0), 
where c™ is the seller's perceived cost of reversing the transactions. Her expected utility 
from delaying the selling the selling decision until period two is 
EU, =E s U{m,G) + pPr{S%)u(m + p-c%,0)  
+/?(l - Pr(S"))£0 («('". C) I i « S" ), 
where c^/ is the perceived cost of selling in the second period, and Pr(5,r") is analogous to 
Pr(S^). As was the case with the potential buyer, wtaN L  is defined as the critical price that 
leaves the potential seller indifferent between selling today and never selling, while wtaL 
leaves her indifferent between selling today and delaying the selling decision until more 
information becomes available. The seller's CC is defined as wtaNL - wtaL. Again, CC is 
sign ambiguous when both delay and reversal opportunities are available. 
3.3 Commitment Cost in the Context of Contingent Valuation 
In the next chapter, I will use contingent valuation techniques to test for the existence 
of commitment cost in a hypothetical market for improved water quality. In order to do this, 
certain modifications have to be made to the model presented in Section 3.2. Primary among 
these is that complete irreversibility is implicit in the CVM survey's referendum format. 
Respondents are presented with a proposal to improve environmental quality and are then 
asked to vote on referendum that would both implement the proposed improvement and 
impose higher taxes. If the ballot measure passes, the government will raise taxes and go 
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ahead with mitigation efforts. While the resulting environmental improvements could later 
be undone, the money spent on mitigation can never be recouped. In the context of the 
model presented in Section 3.2, this is the same as assuming c^> G. 
The referendum format does, however, allow for delay. Some respondents in the 
study I will discuss in Chapter 4 were explicitly informed of their opportunity to delay the 
"purchasing" decision. They were told that, should the initial referendum fail to pass, the 
government would continue to study factors affecting water quality and would give area 
residents another chance to vote on an identical referendum once more information was 
available. In this context, there is the potential that cdbeJy < v . Other respondents were 
informed that there would be no opportunity to delay their decision. They were told that this 
would be the last such referendum, and that if it failed to pass there would be no further 
efforts to improve water quality. This is equivalent to assuming c£'y > v . 
In the remainder of this section, I develop a model of willingness to pay formation in 
the presence of uncertainty, irreversibility, and potential learning. I begin by considering an 
individual who must decide whether to purchase a higher level of environmental quality in 
either or none of two periods. Her utility function is time separable: 
"0H,,g,) + /?"0"2,g2), (3.13) 
where m, represents period t income, g, represents period t environmental quality, and P is 
the discount factor. The status quo level of environmental quality is denoted Go. A higher 
level of environmental quality G can be purchased in the current period, the second period, or 
not at all. However, once the agent has purchased G, the decision is irreversible. If G is 
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purchased in the first period, it can also be enjoyed in the second at no additional cost. In the 
context of the CVM study to be discussed in Chapter 4, G might be achieved through a 
package of government-sponsored mitigation efforts such as dredging the lake, establishing 
buffer strips, and retiring agricultural land around the lake in order to reduce nutrient inflow. 
As in Section 3.2,1 assume away income smoothing. 
The agent is uncertain about the value of G resulting from the proposed policy. This 
may be due, for instance, to her uncertainty regarding the degree to which water quality 
would be improved if the proposed policies were implemented. Her beliefs regarding G and 
the signal s are defined as in the previous section, with the exception that here I am assuming 
G>G 0 .  
Let EUX  denote the agent's expected utility from purchasing G in period one: 
EUX  =E c (u{m x  -  p,G) + pu{m 2 ,G)) ,  (3.14) 
where p is the price of implementing the new environmental policy and £c( ) represents 
expectation over G. Notice that (3.14) differs from (3.11) in that reversal is no longer an 
opt ion.  Let  (p ,  s )  be the agent ' s  expected gain from purchasing G af ter  observing s  :  
Vb%(/>.s) = Ec (u(m2 - p, G) - u(m2,G„)|s). (3.15) 
Observing s ,  she will buy G if and only if (p,s ) > 0. Let the set of signals that will 
induce the agent to purchase G be defined as S^'y(p) = E 5 : V^(p,s) > 0}. Then the 
agent's expected utility if she delays the purchasing decision is 
To obtain closed form solutions, I assume 
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M(mf,£,) = er —+ (l-a)—, 1 = 1,2. 
P P 
(3.17) 
This is a monotonie transformation of the familiar CES utility function, where a e [0,1] is 
the weight the agent puts on income, and p < 1 relates to the agent's elasticity of substitution 
(the elasticity is a = 1/(1- p) ). One of the benefits of the CES utility function is that the 
linear, Cobb-Douglass, and Leontief utility functions are special cases corresponding to 
p = 1,0, and -ao, respectively. I also assume that m, = m2 =m. Given these assumptions, 
(3.14) becomes 
EU, =« ( m  + p 
P P 
(3.18) 
and (3.16) becomes 
m Of EU2 =a — + ( l -a)^  + /?Pr0O m'  
-/?(!-PrCO) m
h  
cc k (1 -or)—— 
.  P P 
a  + (1 -a)  
P 
Of 
£c(G»|^eS»;) 
<3.19) 
Taking into account uncertainty, irreversibility, and the opportunity for learning, the 
agent's decision in period one is whether to buy now or to delay the decision until period two 
when more information will be available. In this dynamic framework, Zhao and Kling 
(2001,2002) show that in the presence of learning the rational agent's maximum willingness 
to pay wtpL is the critical price pL that leaves her indifferent between committing to G in 
period one and delaying her decision until period two. Here, the L superscript represents 
learning. 
Equating EUX  and EUZ  and solving for pL, I find 
wtpL = pL = m -
i 
V 
mp — 
(l-/>tMS£)) 
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(3.20) 
where 
/< = (1 + /Î) (£c(C" ) - G0" ) - /î Pr(S^ )^(£C(G» ! $ e S,^) - G0" ). (3.21) 1 — or 
a 
In the absence of learning, the agent sees her decision as being whether to buy in the 
current period or never to buy. Thus, the learning-constrained agent's willingness to pay 
wtpSL is the critical price pSL that leaves her indifferent between purchasing the environ­
mental improvement in the current period and never purchasing it. That is, 
a 
(m- p S L  Y 
+ (l-or) ENG
P m f  ENGP + PI + (1 -e)^-
P \  P P 
m f  Of) 
(3.22) 
= (1 + P)\  a  — + (1 -a)  — 
VP P 
or 
wtpN L  = p v i  = m -  [ m p  -  (1 + P)  (E c (G P )  -  G P  )  ] ' ,  (3.23) 
where the NL superscript represents no-leaming. Note that wtpN L  is a static measure—no 
consideration of future options is incorporated into its formation. I can now write the CC as 
the following closed-form expression: 
CC = wtpNL — wtpL 
1 
m p  — 
(l-ySPr(O)J - m 
1 -a, (3.24) 
CC will be nonnegative when 
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(3.25) 
Rearranging and simplifying, I can write the above inequality as 
£0(G"UeS£)-GS a(l + /?)(£0(G')-C„'). (3.26) 
This relationship is always satisfied because the expected utility from delaying the purchas­
ing decision will be at least as great as the expected utility from never purchasing. At the 
critical price pL, this implies 
a —+ ( \-a)^~ 
.  P P j  
+ fPr(S*) 
-0(i-p*s£)) a — + (l-a)^ 
.  P P 
(3.27) 
>(1 + P) a — + ( l -a)^£-
.  P P .  
After substituting in pL from equation (3.20), the above inequality reduces to condition 
(3.26), thus proving CC > 0. CC will be strictly positive if Pr(5^) > 0 and 
£0(G'|jeS<t,)>£0(G')>Gf. 
3.4 Commitment Cost When Environmental Quality Deteriorates Over Time 
In this section, I extend the model from Section 3.3 in two ways: (1) status quo 
environmental quality Go is allowed to deteriorate over time, and (2) the price associated 
with attaining G increases as Go falls. The model in Section 3.3 can, of course, be viewed as 
a special case of this more general model. 
Expected utility from purchasing G in period one is unaffected by continued deterio­
ration, and thus EUX is the same as expression (3.14) from the previous section. Let G0 be 
the status quo level of environmental quality in period one, and let the period-two status quo 
level be defined as AG0, where X e [0,1] is a constant associated with the degree of envi­
ronmental deterioration that occurs during the delay period. Further, let p be the cost of 
mitigation if it is undertaken in period one, and let p + cp(X) be the cost of mitigation if it is 
instead undertaken in period two, where <p(\) > 0 and d<p/dX < 0. That is, as the status quo 
level of environmental quality deteriorates over time, the cost of the proposed improvement 
increases. Finally, let V(p,s) be the agent's expected surplus from delaying the purchase 
until after observing s. That is, 
If the agent waits until the second period and observes s, she will vote in favor of the 
proposed improvement if and only if V(p,s)> 0. Let EU2 denote the agent's expected 
utility if she delays the purchasing decision. This can be written as 
where 5^(/>) = (s e S | V(p,s)  > 0} is the set of signals that will induce the agent to pur­
chase G in period two. 
In order to calculate a closed form expression for willingness to pay, I impose the 
following restriction on U(•) : 
V(p,s)-EG  (u(m -  p-<p,G)-u(m,  XG 0  )  15) .  (3.28) 
EU2 = u (m, G0 ) + P Pr(S™)EC  (u(m -  p-<p,G)\  s  e  S d e l  )  
+/?(l-Pr(O)M(m,AG0), 
(3.29) 
u(m t ,g , )=am t  +(l-a)g,, ( = 1,2. (3.30) 
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This is the simple linear utility function, a special case of the CES utility function where 
p = 1.  
As before, given the opportunity for learning, the agent's maximum willingness to 
pay wtpL is the critical price pL that leaves her indifferent between committing to G in 
period one and delaying her decision until period two. The agent's expected utility from 
delaying the decision must now be written to take into account declining status quo environ­
mental quality: 
EU,=am + ( \ -a)G„+ 0?*SZ)(a(m-p-<p) + ( \ -a)E a (G\s<BSÎZ))  
+yS(l - Pi<S£))(am + (1 -a) XG0 ), 
where S£'y is as defined before, and 
Op.s)  = a (-P -  <P) + (1 - a)(£c (G I s)  -  AG„ ). (3.32) 
Equating EUX  and EU 2  yields 
NO' (3'33> 
where 
A 
=^H1 + P(v~ ^ O)4G<> +0 + P)Eci.G) - fiPi(SZ)Ee (G15 e s£)] 
+/?Pr(S*>. 
(3.34) 
buyr  
Given my assumptions on G 0  and G, I know pL  is positive. This is because 
cr,APr(S£)e[0,l],and 
EC (G) = P«SZ)E a  (G|$eS£) + (l-Pr<S£)) Ec(GlseS£). (3.35) 
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It can also be shown that dpL  jdX < 0, implying that the greater the environmental deteriora­
tion without mitigation, the more the agent is willing to pay for mitigation in period one. 
In the no-learning case, the agent's willingness to pay wtpN L  is the critical price pN L  
that leaves her indifferent between purchasing the environmental improvement in the current 
period and never purchasing it. This can be written as 
wtp S L=p S L  =il^((i + /?)£c(G)-(l + /?A)G0). (3.36) 
Given my assumptions on G0 and G, it is easy to show that pNL is positive and that 
dpN L /dk< 0.  
The commitment cost is defined as the difference between wtpN L  and wtpL .  Thus, I 
can write CC as the following closed-form expression: 
CC = + P)EC (G) -  (1 + fSX)G„ ) --(337) 
where A is defined as in equation (3.34). As was the case in Section 3.3, CC is nonnegative 
since the expected utility from delaying the purchasing decision must be at least as great as 
the expected utility from simply never purchasing. To see this, recognize that CC will be 
nonnegative if and only if 
Ea (G | î 6 S£)-IG,  2 0 + /»)£=<G)-(I + . (3.38) 
This is analogous to condition (3.26) in Section 3.3, and it can be shown to hold by compar­
ing the expected utility of learners and non-learners at the critical price PL • Once again, CC 
is strictly positive as long as Pr(5^ ) > 0 and EG (G | s e Sjj ) > Ec (G) > G0. 
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The impact of A on willingness to pay and commitment cost can be seen in Figure 
3.1. In this figure, the light lines represent expected utilities given no environmental deterio­
ration between periods one and two (i.e., A = 1 ), while the heavy lines represent expected 
utilities given a higher level of deterioration (i.e., A < 1 ). Since the expected utility of not 
purchasing in the period one decrease with status quo environmental quality, willingness to 
pay in both the learning and no-learning cases is higher when facing greater deterioration. 
The effect of deterioration on commitment cost, however, is less definite. As shown 
in Figure 3.1, the commitment cost decreases as A decreases, though the figure could also 
have been drawn with CC greater than CC. The sign of 3CC/3A ultimately depends on how 
the probability of pursuing the environmental improvement in the period two Pr(S^) is 
affected by A. 
The intuition behind this can be seen in Figure 3.2. The commitment cost CC is the 
difference between two willingness to pay measures. In the no-learning case, willingness to 
pay is the critical price wtpNL that leaves the agent indifferent between purchasing in period 
one and never  purchasing.  In  the learning case,  wil l ingness  to  pay is  the cr i t ical  pr ice  wtpL  
that leaves the agent indifferent between purchasing in period one and delaying the purchas­
ing decision until period two. In period two, the learning agent will purchase the improved 
quality with probability Pr(S^) and will settle for the status quo with probability 
(l - Pr(S^)). Thus, the only thing differentiating the no-learning and learning problems is 
that in the learning case there is some positive probability that the agent will pursue mitiga-
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tion in the second period. As that probability approaches zero, the difference between the 
two problems diminishes, and CC approaches zero. Therefore, if Pr(S^) decreases as the 
status quo level of environmental quality decreases (i.e., as A decreases), then 5CC/5A > 0. 
Alternatively, if Pr(S6^ ) increases as the status quo level of environmental quality decreases, 
then ÔCC/6X <0. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE DYNAMIC FORMATION OF WTP IN A CONTINGENT VALUATION SETTING 
The maximum amount a consumer is willing to pay (WTP) for a good is a core 
economic concept that is regularly estimated in empirical demand studies, experimental 
laboratory settings, and stated preference surveys. The theoretical basis from which the 
properties of WTP are understood comes from the equivalence of this measure with compen­
sating (or equivalent) variation.1 Hicksian welfare theory further provides a formal basis for 
how these measures vary with prices and the base utility level. 
The equivalence between the variation concepts and WTP comes from the elegant, 
but static neoclassical model. In contrast, the real world is a dynamic environment where 
consumers may have the ability to delay purchase decisions until more information is gath­
ered about a good, its substitutes, market conditions, and other relevant factors. Although 
static Hicksian theory has little to say about how the potential arrival of new information 
and/or the ability to delay a purchase decision might affect the WTP value, recent work by 
Zhao and Kling (2001,2002) systematically investigates learning opportunities in the forma­
tion of WTP. 
In an explicitly dynamic setting characterized by uncertainty, irreversibility, and the 
potential for future learning, WTP for a good diverges from the standard variation measures. 
Given that an agent is uncertain about the actual value of the good she is interested in buying, 
delaying the transaction may be in her best interest if more information regarding the good's 
1 WTP is equivalent to compensating variation for a price decrease or quality increase, and to equivalent 
variation for the opposite cases. 
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value can be gained by waiting. Therefore, in order to commit to the purchase now and forgo 
future learning opportunities, the agent must be compensated by being offered a lower price 
than would have been acceptable were future learning not an option. Zhao and Kling refer to 
this compensation as the commitment cost. Empirical support for the importance of informa­
tion in the formation of WTP values is provided by the numerous experiments and stated 
preference surveys that have found that WTP values can vary significantly with the amount 
of information provided about the good. Examples include Samples, Dixon, and Gowen 
(1986); Bergstrom, Stoll, and Randall (1990); Whitehead and Blomquist (1997); Blomquist 
and Whitehead (1998); Cummings and Taylor (1999); and List (2001)." 
Also related is the quasi-option value concept developed by Arrow and Fisher (1974) 
and Henry (1974). Option value, in this context, takes into consideration that, faced with 
uncertainty and asymmetric irreversibility, there exists an incentive to delay development 
until more information becomes available. An agent who considers this irreversibility and 
uncertainty will pursue less development in the current period than a naive agent. Hanemann 
(1989) notes that the option value is the conditional value of perfect information, conditional, 
that is, on the resource being preserved today.3 
A key prediction from Zhao and Kling's model is that commitment cost increases as 
it is easier for an agent to delay making a decision and, therefore, collect relevant information 
prior to committing to a purchase decision. That is, the willingness to pay for a good today 
will decline when there are additional opportunities to purchase the good or a close substitute 
in the future. In this case, today's WTP is not comprised simply of the expected surplus from 
2 For counter results, see Boyle, Reiling, and Phillips (1990) and Loomis, Gonzalez-Caban, and Gregory ( 1994). 
3 See also Conrad (1980), Viscusi (1988), and Usategui (1990). 
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consuming the good. Rather, WTP includes commitment cost, and is a dynamic measure that 
may change daily as consumers update their information about the surplus the good might 
yield them. WTP also depends on the fundamental properties of the market environment, 
such as the ability to reverse or delay the purchase. 
The purpose of this chapter is to develop and implement a test of whether WTP val­
ues are formed dynamically as the theory predicts, and whether the magnitude of the dy­
namic component, the commitment cost, is sufficiently large to merit further understanding 
and research. To do so, I develop an empirical specification of dynamic WTP derived 
directly from the theory, and use this specification to test whether the opportunity to delay 
the decision to "purchase" improved environmental quality affects willingness to pay, and, in 
particular, whether the effects are consistent with the predictions of the commitment cost 
model. Data for this analysis were collected in the fall of 2000 using a survey designed to 
estimate the value area residents place on improved water quality in Clear Lake, a spring-fed, 
glacial lake located in north-central Iowa.4 In order to gauge the impact of potential learning 
on WTP, some respondents were told that the hypothetical referendum contained in the 
survey instrument represented their final chance to vote on improving water quality. Others 
were told that, should the referendum fail, they would be given a second chance to vote on 
the same initiative once further research had been conducted into improving water quality. 
The survey's results indicate that offering respondents the ability to delay their decision 
significantly reduces willingness to pay, confirming the predictions of the theory. 
4 The Iowa Department of Natural Resources provided the funding for this study. 
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This chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.1 describes the design of the stated 
preference instrument and the empirical test. Section 4.2 presents the key findings and test 
results. Concluding remarks follow in Section 4.3. 
4.1 Design of the Empirical Test 
Section 3.3 develops the theoretical model that I will use in this chapter. In that 
section, I define commitment cost (CC) as the difference between no-learning willingness to 
pay 
wtpN L  5 pN L  =m- m 
-(l + /?)I^(£c(GO-CoP)j . (4.1) 
and willingness to pay in a dynamic setting characterized by uncertainty, irreversibility, and 
potential learning 
wtpL = pL ~ m - m ' 
where A is defined as 
A = (l + /?)—(E^GO-G'J-^PrCS,,)—(EC(G- |ieSn)-Gf). (43) 
a a x  '  
Thus, CC can be written as the closed-form expression 
(l-/?Pr<S„))J 
1 —or 
(4.2) 
CC = wtpNL — wtpL = mp -
i 
V 
-  nt -Q + fi)^-(EG{G')-GS)\" -(4.4) (U/fPrOS,,)) 
To test whether the effects of potential learning and uncertainty influence WTP as 
predicted by the commitment cost theory, I estimate respondent /' s stated willingness to pay 
as 
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WTP, = wtp]"- -Cq+e,., (4.5) 
where wtp"1 is no-learning willingness to pay as defined in (4.1), £i is a mean-zero error 
term, and CC, captures respondent z's commitment cost. CC, will be positive if WTP is 
formed dynamically, and will be zero otherwise. 
While I use the exact theoretical representation for wtpNL derived from the CES utility 
function (see Mansfield 1999 for a similar approach, but without commitment costs), I 
employ the following simplified expression for CC,: 
where D?day is a dummy variable equal to one if respondent i can potentially delay her 
decision, and D"lVar is a dummy variable equal to one if respondent i faces a high degree of 
uncertainty regarding water quality after the proposed improvements. Although simple, this 
formulation takes into account the two key relationships identified in the theory above: 
commitment cost is present only when there is potential for future learning, and commitment 
cost varies according to the degree of uncertainty the respondent faces. 
Following Cameron (1988), WTPt can be estimated from dichotomous choice data by 
noting that the probability that respondent i votes "yes" (K, = I) on a referendum to improve 
environmental quality is 
CC, = D*lay (yDelay + yHiVarD"iVar ), (4.6) 
Pr(% =l) = Pr(Pr7%>7;) 
(4.7) 
f  Tj — wtpf + CC, 
= 1 - Pr ei < 
\ 
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where 7} is the policy price faced by respondent i  and r is the standard error of e ( .  Assum­
ing st is drawn from the extreme value error distribution yields the following logistic expres­
sion for the probability of a "yes": 
Tj -  wtpf  + CC, Pr(%=l) = 1+exp (4.8) 
The corresponding log likelihood function is 
lnA = ^-l(ln 
+Z0-15)  
1 + exp Tj - wtp. + CC. 
x 
T; — wtp* + CC, \ f  f  
- In 1 + exp 
1 V 
Tj - wtPj + CCj 
r 
(4.9) 
Estimates of the parameters from expression (4.9) can be readily obtained from maximum 
likelihood estimation. An estimate of respondent /'s willingness to pay, WTPi, can be 
calculated as follows: 
WTPt = wtp? - C C i .  (4.10) 
A survey instrument was designed to value various plans for improving the water 
quality at Clear Lake in northern Iowa. The survey first described the lake's current condi­
tion in terms of water clarity, color, odor, fish catch, and the frequency of algae blooms and 
beach closings. Next, the survey described three future water quality scenarios correspond­
ing to different degrees of environmental mitigation. Each of these scenarios was followed 
by a referendum-format CVM question designed to elicit respondents' willingness to pay in 
order to achieve the conditions described. Hoehn and Randall (1987) show that the referen­
dum mechanism is demand revealing so long as respondent i believes that all respondents 
face the same policy price, and that the referendum will pass if the majority votes in favor of 
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the proposed project. Strictly speaking, truth telling is a voter's weakly dominant strategy 
when voting is costless. Carson, Groves, and Machina (2000) argue that responses to such 
stated preference questions will contain relevant economic information so long as the re­
spondent perceives there to be some positive chance that her response will influence policy, 
and so long as she cares about the outcome of that policy. A copy of the survey instrument 
can be found in Appendix A. 
Prior to the actual mailing of the survey, the instrument was presented to a focus 
group of local residents to test its clarity and realism. This was followed by a mailed pretest. 
In its final form, the survey instrument was sent to a random sample of900 households in the 
cities of Clear Lake and Ventura, Iowa, both of which are located on Clear Lake. This 
sample was drawn from the white pages by Survey Sampling, Inc., a Connecticut-based 
market research firm. Of these 900 surveys, 132 were eventually returned as undeliverable. 
Following the procedure in Dillman (1978), a follow-up postcard and survey instrument were 
sent to those households that did not respond to the initial mailing. The eventual response 
rate among surveys successfully delivered was about 70%. 
A summary of the respondents' socioeconomic characteristics can be found in Table 
4.1. Compared to the most recent county-level census data, survey respondents, on average, 
were significantly more likely to be college educated, to be older, to be male, to be home­
owners, and to live in a larger household. Respondents' average income was not signifi­
cantly different from the county average. While no county-level data is available for year-
round residency, it is likely that seasonal residents were underrepresented in the sample since 
many do not receive mail at their Clear Lake address. 
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Table 4.1 Characteristics of Survey Respondents ( n = 357 ) 
Variable Definition Mean Standard 
Deviation 
County 
Average 
Income Total household income 56,000 44,000 51,000 
Education 1 if college graduate 0.36 0.48 0.16 
Age The respondent's age 55 15 47 
Gender 1 if male 0.65 0.48 0.47 
Family size Includes adults and children 2.6 1.3 2.3 
Homeowner 1 if own home 0.91 0.29 0.72 
Year-round resident 1 if year-round resident 0.95 0.22 — 
Six versions of the survey instrument were sent out, each differing in terms of the 
potential for future learning and the degree of uncertainty surrounding water quality after the 
proposed improvement while holding constant the mean value of the improvement. Survey 
Version 1 presented respondents with a low degree of variance {e.g., water clarity between 6 
and 8 feet after improvements) and no potential for future learning. The color photo and 
diagram used to depict this low level of uncertainty can be found in Appendix B. The 
absence of future learning potential was written into the CVM question as follows: 
Further, suppose this survey represents the State's only chance to gather information 
about what kind of value people put on Clear Lake. Please respond as if this will be 
your final opportunity to vote on the issue, and that if the following referendum fails 
to pass, there will be no future programs to improve water quality at Clear Lake. 
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Would you vote "yes" on a referendum that would adopt the proposed program but 
cost you Sp (payable in five Sp/5 installments over a five year period)? 
Version 2 again presented respondents with low variance but allowed for potential future 
learning by offering respondents a second chance to vote on the referendum: 
Further, suppose that if the referendum passes, the improvements would proceed 
immediately. However, if the referendum fails, any plans to improve the lake would 
be delayed for one year while further research takes place into the causes of lake 
pollution as well as alternative clean-up approaches. After this delay, any new 
information from studying the lake will be made available and you will then get a 
final chance to vote on the same referendum. Would you vote "yes" on a referendum 
that would adopt the proposed program but cost you Sp (payable in five $p/5 
installments over a five year period)? 
Version 3 differed from Version 2 only in that respondents were told that, should the initial 
referendum fail, five years would pass before they would be given a second chance to vote. 
Survey Versions 4, 5, and 6 were analogous to 1,2, and 3 except that respondents 
faced a higher degree of uncertainty in terms of the expected water quality (e.g., water clarity 
between 2 and 12 feet after the proposed improvements).5 The color diagram used to depict 
this higher level of uncertainty appears in Appendix C. 
5 Due to limnological realities, when we conduct mean-preserving spreads on the two key water quality 
variables, water clarity and algae blooms, the implied changes on the remaining variables are not mean-
preserving. That is, strictly speaking, we are not able to control the uncertainties independent of the mean water 
quality levels. 
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Using these data, I test for the presence of a dynamic element in the formation of the 
WTP values by testing whether CC in (4.5) is significantly different from zero. I further test 
two of the theory's comparative static predictions. First, that CC is only positive in the 
presence of future learning (i.e., yDelay > 0 ). Second, that CC increases when the agent is 
more uncertain (faces higher variance) about the level of G after the proposed improvement 
(/.e., y^>0). 
4.2 Empirical Findings 
A total of 357 respondents provided completed surveys. Of these, forty-three respon­
dents answered a follow-up question in such a way as to indicate that they did not understand 
the CVM question or considered it unrealistic. These respondents may not have given 
serious consideration to the policy price, in which case their responses to the CVM question 
would contain little or no information regarding their valuation of the resource. Therefore, I 
treat such answers as protest responses and exclude them from the following analysis. While 
I view this as the cleanest approach, results including the protest responses are qualitatively 
unchanged from those presented here. 
I have also excluded respondents who were offered the opportunity to vote again in 
one year if the hypothetical referendum failed to pass. A typographical error in the first 
mailing of survey Version 5 left the CVM question ambiguous. While the error was 
corrected by the second mailing, it is impossible to know how the intitial error affected 
respondents' valuations. I have, however, also estimated the model throwing out only the 
sixty-one responses to the first mailing of Version 5 and including the responses from the 
second mailing. The results are not qualatatively different from those with the one-year wait 
excluded. Interestingly, there is no significant difference in estimated willingness to pay 
between respondents offered one- and five-year waits. I tested this by estimating willingness 
to pay for the environmental improvement using only the data from respondents offered the 
opportunity for delay. I also included a dummy variable distinguishing respondents offered a 
one-year wait from those offered a five years. The coeffiecient associated with this dummy 
variable was not significanlty different from zero (t = 0.267 ). This suggests that the benefit 
associated with an additional four years of learning are offset by the cost associated with 
delaying the proposed improvements another four years. 
Table 4.2 presents the results of the logistic regression described in Section 4.1. To 
form the wtpM equation for estimation, the discount factor ft was set to 0.758. This corre­
sponds to a riskless rate of return of 5.70%, which is equal to the return on a five-year 
Treasury note issued in November 2000, the month the survey was initially mailed. Qualita­
tive results were unaffected by the choice of p. In order to confine a to the unit interval, I 
set a = ex /(I + e') and estimate x. Likewise, to restrict p to the (-co, 1] interval, I set 
p = -ey +1 and estimatey. To form the expression [EG(GP)~ G£ ), a uniform distribution 
over the range of water clarity values reported in the respondent's survey instrument was 
computed as described earlier. 
The results in the second column of Table 4.2 correspond to the basic CES model. To 
investigate the robustness of the results, I also estimate a random parameters specification 
that  a l lows a and p to  vary with income,  ignoring the interval  res t r ic t ion in  the case of  a .  
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Table 4.2 Regression Results 
Basic CES 
Preferences 
Heterogeneous CES 
Preferences 
r 
a 
a Intercept 
®Income 
P Intercept 
PIncome 
Y Delay 
Y HiVar 
Percent correct 
0.00129*** (3.51)' 
0.985*** (4.23) 
0.277(1.03) 
0.918** (2.48) 
-0.550 (-1.29) 
64% 
0.00100** (2.42) 
1.03*** (149) 
-0.00124*** (-3.95) 
0.610*** (2.59) 
-0.0281*** (-3.76) 
0.831** (2.14) 
-0.440 (-0.997) 
66% 
Asymptotic / ratio in parentheses. 
** Significant at the 0.05 level. 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level. 
More specifically, or, is estimated as alntercep, + aMcomem,. and /?, is estimated as 
- e X P  i n t e r c e p t  +  P l n c a n > e » h )  +  1  
As seen in Table 4.2, the estimate of r is positive and highly significant in both 
models, indicating the demand curve for improved environmental quality is downward 
6 A third model was estimated allowing a, p , yDelay and y"'yar to vary with income. The results are not 
reported here because the restriction = r'OHZ. - 0 could not be rejected at conventional significance levels 
(Zz~ 0.58 [2]). 
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sloping. As expected, the estimate for a reported in the second column is very close to one, 
indicating that the overall weight on water quality is small. In the case where a varies 
across individuals, the coefficient afncome is negative and highly significant, indicating that 
respondents put more weight on environmental quality as their income increases. The 
average value for a is 0.959 with a 95% confidence interval of (0.929,0.985), which was 
calculated using a bootstrapping technique. Specifically, 1000 realizations of cclmerapl and 
a income were drawn from a multivariate normal distribution with a variance-covariance matrix 
and mean vector taken from the maximum likelihood estimation whose results are presented 
in Table 4.2. For each of these draws, I calculated a sample average for à . The reported 
confidence interval was generated by ranking these 1000 à estimates and deleting the 
highest and lowest twenty-five.7 
The estimate of p reported in the second column of Table 4.2 suggest that while 
there is some degree of substitutability between money and environmental quality, the two 
are not perfect substitutes.8 As is discussed in Section 4.1, p is related to the elasticity of 
substitution in that a = 1/(1 - p). The value of p reported in column two corresponds to 
(T = 1.38. The average estimated value for p from the second model is 0.410 with an 
associated 95% confidence interval of (0.149, 0.595), which follows from the p,Hlmepl and 
Pincome estimates reported in the third column. As described for a, this confidence interval 
7 In the heterogeneous case, a was not constrained to the unit interval as it was in the basic case. While 
confining a to the unit interval in the heterogeneous case does not qualitatively affect the results, it does result 
in much wider confidence intervals for the WTP estimates. For this reason, I have opted to estimate a simply 
as a linear function of income. 
8 One of the appealing features of the CES functional form is that it allows explicit estimation of this degree of 
substitution, which Randall and StoU (1980) and Hanemann (1991) have shown to be key to the formation of 
WTP values for quality changes. 
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was calculated by bootstrapping. The estimate for p[ncome is negative and highly significant, 
implying that respondents with higher income are more willing to substitute money for 
environmental quality. The average estimate of p from the third column of Table 4.2 
corresponds to <r = 1.69. 
I turn now to testing for the presence of dynamic components in the formation of 
WTP, which depends critically on the sign and significance of the y parameters. The 
estimate of yDelay is positive and highly significant in both specifications. Thus, offering 
respondents the opportunity to delay their decision until more information becomes available 
increases commitment costs. However, estimates of yH,Var are not significantly different 
from zero in either of the regressions. A chi-squared test rejects the null hypothesis that the 
Y coefficients jointly equal zero at the 0.03 level in the basic case and at the 0.07 level in the 
heterogeneous case Qf2 = 6.77 [2] and f = 5.31 [2], respectively). Using the same 
bootstrapping technique discussed earlier to generate 1000 estimates of mean CC,, 99% of 
the realizations were greater than zero in the basic case, as were 97% in the heterogeneous 
case. These results indicate that there is a statistically significant dynamic component to 
WTP. 
Further, the comparative static prediction that introducing delay (and the subsequent 
potential for learning) yields positive commitment costs is also confirmed by the data, as the 
yDelay coefficient is highly significant. 
However, the lack of significance of the yHlVar parameter does not support the 
comparative static prediction that commitment costs are positively correlated with the degree 
of uncertainty respondents face. This may seem surprising given that uncertainty is a neces­
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sary condition for the existence of commitment cost. One explanation may be that the 
uncertainty concerning the expected degree of water quality improvements is only one source 
of the uncertainty respondents face. Specifically, the water quality variable does not measure 
the uncertainty in value respondents might eventually derive from the improvements. 
Therefore, finding that yH,Var is not significantly different from zero may indicate that the 
latter type of uncertainty is driving the presence of commitment costs. Another possible 
explanation is that, as noted earlier in a footnote, the mean water quality characteristics are 
not the precisely identical across the two uncertainty levels (recall that while water clarity 
was varied across treatments using a mean-preserving change of spreads, other measures of 
water quality could not be varied similarly and still be consistent with the underlying limnol­
ogy). Thus, respondents may have viewed the increased uncertainty as being offset by 
increased mean water quality levels. 
Table 4.3 presents estimates of mean WTP conditional on both the opportunity for 
learning and the level of uncertainty. Again, for the sake of comparison, I include the results 
of both regressions. 
These results indicate that reported willingness to pay for changes in environmental 
quality can have a large option value component. As a percentage of the no-learning WTP, 
the commitment costs range from 25% to 57%. If researchers are to properly interpret 
empirical welfare measures, it is critical to recognize the existence of these options and to 
understand their significance in welfare assessment. 
Reading earlier drafts of this chapter, some economists suggested that fewer respon­
dents voting "yes" when offered the chance to delay their decision may simply be due to their 
putting off the taxes associated with the proposed improvement as long as possible. My 
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Table 4.3 Willingness to Pay and Commitment Costs 
Basic CES Heterogeneous CES 
Preferences Preferences 
WTP1 CC WTPNL WTPL CC WTPNL 
Sample Average 661 475 ÏÏ36 683 476 ÏÏ59 
(467,2277)' (34,1047) (948,3079) (338, 1652) (-10,1151) (836,2404) 
Low Variance 494 663 1157 532 639 1171 
(259,2110) (179,1401) (985,3259) (173, 1470) (22,2104) (831,2678) 
High Variance 833 282 1115 834 313 1147 
(502,2908) (-257,948) (929,3235) (389, 2463) (-313, 1317) (793, 2693) 
a Numbers in parentheses are 95% confidence intervals calculated via bootstrapping. 
results, then, would not be consistent with the existence of commitment costs, so much as 
with respondents discounting the future. This, however, overlooks the fact that the plan not 
only imposes higher taxes, but also provides area residents with improved environmental 
quality. And since delaying the tax increase necessarily delays the realization of the water 
quality improvements, the simple discounting argument seems less appropriate. Further, 
recall that some respondents were offered the potential of a one-year delay, while others were 
offered a five-year delay. The discounting argument would predict that those offered a five-
year wait would be even less likely to vote yes since they can delay the tax increase five 
times as long. This was not the case. As I discussed earlier in this section, WTP estimates 
from the one- and five-year groups are not significantly different. 
4.3 Policy Implications and Conclusions 
These results have important implications for the design of stated preference surveys. 
If uncertainty, irreversibility, and the potential for learning are inherent to a policy under 
consideration, then commitment cost is relevant to the eventual policy decision, and stated 
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preference questions should be written to reflect this. My analysis suggests that it is espe­
cially important that the survey instrument accurately convey the potential for delaying the 
decision, as this can have important consequences for the magnitude of WTP. 
If the policy-relevant level of uncertainty and/or options for delay differ from those 
perceived by survey respondents (either because respondents do not believe the information 
presented in the survey or because they use other sources of information to form their beliefs 
about delay options and future learning), researchers may need to be careful in using stated 
WTP values directly in benefit-cost assessment, as the values may include discounts for 
commitment costs that are not appropriate for inclusion in benefit-cost analysis. 
Suppose, for example, the issue under consideration is whether to save a pristine wil­
derness area from imminent and irreversible commercial development. In this case, there is 
no potential for delaying the decision and, thus, no potential for future learning. Here, 
commitment cost is not policy relevant. Instead, the appropriate measure of welfare change 
is simply equivalent variation. A study that does not convey the immediacy of the decision 
may mistakenly capture commitment cost as part of its estimate of WTP, thus biasing the 
estimate downward. If respondents mistakenly believe that there are delay options and future 
learning opportunities, the WTP values estimated from a stated preference exercise will 
inaccurately reflect the value of the resource. 
On the other hand, suppose policymakers are considering converting an empty com­
mercial lot into a public park. Assuming that money spent on the project cannot be recouped, 
that there is some degree of uncertainty regarding the benefit local residents will derive from 
the park if it is built, and that the project can reasonably be delayed until some future date 
when residents may have a better estimate of the park's value, then commitment cost is 
policy relevant; that is, the appropriate value to use in a benefit assessment regarding a 
decision on the project today would include a discount for the lost opportunities for delay. 
To avoid overestimating WTP, a survey instrument intended to estimate the value of the 
proposed project must be written so that it captures commitment cost. In particular, the 
instrument should explicitly note the potential for delay and subsequent learning. 
Further, respondents may be demanding options that reflect their own level of uncer­
tainty about the good at the time of the survey, rather than the best scientific information 
available. Consider the extreme case where results of an action may be very certain to the 
scientific community, but the issue described in a survey may be new to respondents. In this 
situation, respondents might erroneously assume the information provided to be uncertain, 
and thus demand compensation for losing the option to better inform themselves about the 
good, even though no real uncertainty about the project exists. 
Many applied welfare analyses require the estimate of the value of an environmental 
service or improvement, regardless of the decision framework. For example, policymakers 
may simply be interested in knowing the welfare effect of having a better water quality in a 
local lake, even though they have no plan to take action now or in the future. In this case, the 
relevant value measure wtpNL does not include commitment costs. However, survey ques­
tions in CVM studies are generally framed as hypothetical decisions, and commitment costs 
may arise if respondents think that there is the potential for delaying that decision. It is 
important, then, that the survey be designed to minimize or eliminate commitment costs, for 
example, by informing respondents that that the survey represents their only chance to make 
their preferences known. 
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In this chapter, I test for the effects of potential future learning on WTP in the pres­
ence of uncertainty and irreversibility, and whether those effects are consistent with the 
presence of commitment costs. Using a survey instrument designed specifically to measure 
WTP given varying degrees of learning potential and uncertainty, I collected data from Clear 
Lake-area residents regarding their valuation of a proposed project to improve water quality 
in Clear Lake. My findings show that respondents' willingness to pay is indeed sensitive to 
the potential for future learning. This is consistent with the dynamic formation of WTP 
values and suggests that CVM practitioners must take care to accurately represent the poten­
tial for future learning. 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE DYNAMIC FORMATION OF WTP AND WTA IN AN EXPERIMENTAL SETTING 
Traditional, neoclassical consumer theory predicts that willingness to pay for a good 
(WTP) and willingness to accept compensation in exchange for that same good (WTA) 
should differ by only a small margin, if at all. In particular, Hicksian theory (1943) shows 
that, in a static setting, a consumer's willingness to pay for a price decrease or quality in­
crease is equal to the compensating variation, while willingness to accept compensation in 
exchange for that same price decrease or quality increase is equal to the equivalent variation 
(see Figures 5.1 and 5.2). Willig (1976) further develops this argument, showing that for 
price changes, compensating and equivalent variations should only differ substantially when 
income effects are very large or when the budget share of the good in question is large. 
Randall and StoU (1980) extend Willig's result to quantity changes. 
However, these theoretical analyses fail to explain the results of more than 200 eco­
nomic laboratory experiments and contingent valuation (CVM) studies that have consistently 
found that people require much greater compensation in exchange for a good than they are 
willing to pay to receive it. Examples of empirical studies that find a stark difference be­
tween WTA and WTP include Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler's (1990) experimental work 
using simple private goods (e.g., coffee mugs, chocolate bars), and Brookshire and Coursey's 
(1987) CVM study estimating the value of trees in a Colorado park. In their exhaustive 
survey of the empirical literature, Horowitz and McConnell (2000a) find that, on average, the 
ratio of WTA to WTP for private goods is nearly three to one, and that the same ratio for 
public goods is more than ten to one. Looking at the empirical evidence, it seems clear that a 
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disparity exists between WTA and WTP and that that disparity is robust across many types of 
goods. 
A number of theories have been advanced attempting to explain this apparent anom­
aly. These theories generally fall into one of two broad categories: behavioral arguments 
borrowing from the psychology literature, and neoclassical arguments attempting to explain 
the disparity by extending neoclassical utility theory. The behavioral category includes 
Tversky and Kahneman's (1991) endowment effect theory, which follows from their work on 
prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). Also in this category is Loomes and Sug-
den's (1982) theory of regret aversion. 
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Neoclassical arguments include Heiner (1983) and Hoehn and Randall's (1987) work 
on value uncertainty, Hanemann's (1991) model based on the substitution effect, and, most 
recently, Zhao and Kling's (2001, 2002) commitment cost model.1 Zhao and Kling use real 
options theory to analyze the effect of potential future learning on WTP and WTA in the 
presence of uncertainty and limited reversibility or delay. 
In this chapter, I lay out the design and results of a pair of experimental economic 
tests of the commitment cost theory. In the first of these experiments, my aim is test whether 
subjects' perceptions about the difficulty of delay and reversal affect WTA and WTP in a 
manner consistent with the commitment cost theory, whether this can explain the disparity 
observed in the experimental literature, and whether providing subjects with information 
about the structure of the market affects their valuations. Subjects in this experiment bid to 
either buy or sell a private good in two auction rounds. After each of these rounds, subjects 
completed a survey intended to gauge their perceptions regarding the difficulty of selling and 
buying the good outside of the experimental market. In two of the four experimental treat­
ments, subjects received information about the outside market structure before the second 
round of bidding. The results of this first experiment suggest that subjects' perceptions do in 
fact affect their bids, at least in the case of potential buyers. However, providing subjects 
with relevant information about the relative difficulty of delaying a transaction or reversing 
outside of the experiment does not significantly affect their bids. 
In the second experiment, my goal is test whether manipulating the difficulty of delay 
and reversal affects subjects' WTA and WTP in a way that is consistent with the predictions 
of the commitment cost model. The second experiment is similar to the first, but, depending 
1 A more thorough discussion of all of these theories can be found in Chapter 2. 
the treatment they were assigned to, subjects were given the chance to either reverse or delay 
a transaction within the experimental setting. The results of this test do not support the 
predictions of the commitment cost model. 
This chapter is organized as follows. Sections 5.1 and 5.2 lay out the design and 
empirical results of Experiment 1. Likewise, Sections 5.3 and 5.4 lay out the design and 
empirical results of Experiment 2. Conclusions are reserved for Section 5.5. 
5.1 The Design of Experiment 1 
As I show in Section 3.1, the commitment cost model predicts that if the value formu­
lation process is dynamic, and if agents, whether they be buyers or sellers, perceive the 
difficulty of reversing a transaction to be greater than the difficulty of delaying it, stated 
WTA will be greater than stated WTP even if agents are risk neutral. Therefore, in order for 
the dynamic nature of the value formulation process to drive WTA-WTP disparity, it is 
necessary (1) that the perceived relative difficulties of reversal and delay affect agents' 
valuations in a manner consistent with Zhao and Kling's model, and (2) that both buyers and 
sellers, on average, perceive reversal to be relatively more difficult than delay. 
Kling, List, and Zhao (2001, henceforth KLZ) report the results of an experimental 
sportscard auction intended to test these two points. Attendees of a sportscard convention 
were either endowed with or given the chance to examine a sportscard with a market value of 
roughly $12. The attendees were then offered the chance to place a bid to either sell or buy 
the card, depending on whether or not they had initially been endowed with it. After submit­
ting their bids, attendees completed a survey designed to obtain information about their 
perceptions regarding the difficulty of selling the card in another venue and of purchasing the 
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card outside of the experimental auction. The authors found that for both amateur traders and 
professional dealers, perceptions of these delay and reversal difficulties had a significant 
effect on bid magnitude, and that that effect was consistent with the predictions of the 
commitment cost model. However, among attendees who did not intend to keep the card if 
they left the auction with it, the null hypothesis that both potential buyers and sellers had the 
same beliefs about the relative difficulty of buying versus selling outside of the experimental 
auction could not be rejected at conventional significance levels ( = 0.25 [2]). in other 
words, buyers and sellers did not both perceive reversal to be more difficult than delay. 
While KLZ's findings are suggestive, further empirical work is necessary to fully un­
derstand the dynamic formation of WTA and WTP. It should be kept in mind that the WTA-
WTP disparity literature has been much studied in experimental auctions conducted in a 
controlled laboratory setting (e.g., Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler 1990; Shogren et al. 
1994; Knetsch, Tang, and Thaler 2001). It would, therefore, be useful to test the predictions 
of Zhao and Kling's theory in that same setting. If commitment costs are a component of the 
WTA-WTP disparity generally, their presence should be detectable in controlled experiments 
as well as in the field. 
This first experiment is intended to help bridge the gap between the commitment cost 
theory and the larger WTA-WTP disparity literature. In this section, I describe the design of 
an experiment intended to test whether commitment costs, if they exists in a lab setting, are 
the proper sign and of sufficient size that they can explain at least part of the WTA-WTP 
disparity observed in studies such as Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler's (henceforth KKT). 
The design of my study is similar to KLZ's in that potential buyers (sellers) submit a bid 
indicating their maximum willingness to pay (minimum willingness to accept compensation 
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in exchange) for a good, and then complete a survey designed to obtain information about 
their perceptions regarding the difficulty of selling and buying the good outside the experi­
mental market. However, my study differs from KLZ's in that I conduct a second auction 
round after having given some of the subjects information about the structure of the outside 
market. 
The design of my study is also similar to KKT's. All subjects in a treatment were as­
signed the role of either buyer or seller, and given the chance to buy or sell a private good in 
a series of auctions. Where my design differs from KKT's is that subjects were asked to 
complete a survey similar to the one used in KLZ. This allows me to test whether subjects 
consider dynamic aspects of the market when formulating their valuation of a good. In 
particular, I test whether subjects' perceptions about the relative difficulty of reversal versus 
delay affect their valuation. By comparing subjects' bids with what they report as their 
perceived difficulties of delay and reversal, I can test whether subjects form their values in a 
way that is consistent with the commitment cost model. 
I also test whether providing subjects with information about the structure of 
the outside market affects their valuation of the good. The commitment cost predicts that if 
buyers and sellers have different perceptions about the relative difficulties of reversal and 
delay, this will lead to a gap between WTA and WTP. Therefore, if information provided to 
buyers and sellers brings each group's perceptions more in line with the other's, this should 
decrease that gap. In order to test whether this is actually the case, I compare both groups' 
perceptions before and after they were provided with information about the true potential for 
reversal and delay. 
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The experiment consisted of four treatments—two WTP and two WTA. In the WTP 
Control treatment, all subjects were assigned the role of potential buyers. The subjects first 
participated in a practice auction for a dollar bill. This was followed by two potentially 
binding auction rounds for a coffee mug, each followed by a survey eliciting subjects' 
perceptions regarding the difficulty of buying and selling the good outside the experiment. 
The WTP Information treatment differed only in that subjects were presented with informa­
tion about the outside market for mugs between the first and second auction rounds for the 
mug. In particular, they were told where the mugs were purchased and what that store's 
policy was on returns and exchanges. WTA Control and Information treatments were similar 
to the WTP treatments, except each subject was endowed with a dollar bill and a coffee mug, 
and then offered the opportunity to sell them. 
The commitment cost model predicts that if the value formulation process is dynamic, 
subjects' valuations will be affected by their perceptions of the difficulty of both buying and 
selling the good in the future. More specifically, subjects who believe that selling outside the 
experiment is more difficult than buying will submit bids that are, on average, lower than 
subjects who believe buying outside the experiment is relatively difficult. Further, insomuch 
as the information provided in the Information treatments brings subjects' perceptions in line 
with one another's, this should cause their valuations to converge. 
Subjects for this study were recruited from Principles of Economics classes at Iowa 
State University during the spring semester of2002. Thirty students participated in each of 
the four experimental treatments, for a total of 120 subjects. While the four treatments were 
conducted on four different days, subjects were recruited such that the class they were 
recruited from would not meet between treatments. This was done to reduce the possibility 
of students who participated in early treatments sharing information with classmates who 
would participate in later treatments. Each subject was paid $15 for participating. A sum­
mary of subjects' socioeconomic characteristics can be found in Table 5.1. The numbers for 
income and age seem reasonable considering the population from which the subjects were 
drawn. Women, however, are significantly underrepresented compared to the university's 
enrollment (44.5% women). The male dominance of the sample may be due to the popula­
tion the subjects were drawn from. It is also worth noting that age, gender, and income did 
not vary significantly across the WTA and WTP treatments. 
Each experimental treatment had six steps. (1) Subjects were read an introduction to 
the experiment and an explanation of the random nth-price auction mechanism. (2) Subjects 
submitted bids in a non-binding auction for a dollar bill. (3) The monitor explained that the 
next two auction rounds would be for an Iowa State University-logo coffee mug and that 
only one of the two rounds would be binding. (4) Subjects inspected the mug; submitted bids 
indicating their WTP or WTA, depending on the treatment; and completed a perceptions 
survey. In the WTA and WTP Information treatments, subjects were then given information 
about the difficulty of buying and selling the mug outside of the experiment. (5) Subjects 
submitted a second bid indicating either their WTP or WTA, and completed a second percep­
tions survey. (6) The binding round and random nth price were determined and announced, 
and any transactions agreed to were carried out. Appendix E contains the actual instructions 
given to subjects in the WTP Information treatment. These instructions and the instructions 
used in Experiment 2 borrow their description of the auction mechanism from Shogren et al. 
(2001b) and their follow-up quiz format from Rousu et al. (2002). 
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Table 5.1 Characteristics of Subjects in Experiment 1 
All Treatments WTP Treatments WTA Treatments 
(n = 120) (n = 60) ( n = 60 ) 
Mean 
(Std Dev) 
Median Mean 
(Std Dev) 
Median Mean 
(Std Dev) 
Median 
Age 20.3 19.0 19.8 19.0 20.8 19.0 
(9.33) (3.10) (12.7) 
Female 0.33 0.00 0.28 0.00 0.38 0.00 
(0.47) (0.45) (0.49) 
Income 5423 4000 6091 4500 4778 3500 
(5574) (6418) (4578) 
During the first step, subjects read along as the monitor read the experiment's instruc­
tions aloud. These instructions contained both a brief introduction to the experiment, as well 
as a detailed description of the workings of the random nth-price auction. The monitor also 
went over an example auction on the blackboard and administered a short quiz to test sub­
jects' understanding of the auction mechanism. 
The second step was a non-binding practice auction for a dollar bill. This auction was 
intended to further familiarize subjects with the auction mechanism. Depending on whether 
subjects in a given round had been assigned the role of buyers or sellers, they bid to buy or 
sell a dollar bill. Bids were collected and ranked on the blackboard. A cut-off bid was 
randomly determined and announced along with the cut-off price. Subjects were then 
informed that, had this been a real round, anyone who submitted a bid above (below) the cut­
off price would buy (sell) a dollar bill. 
During step three, the monitor informed subjects that the following two auction 
rounds would be for Iowa State University-logo coffee mugs, but that only one of the two 
rounds would be binding, and that the binding round would be determined by a coin flip after 
both rounds had been completed. This was done to eliminate demand-curve effects. 
In step four, subjects were given the chance to inspect the mugs being auctioned off 
and to submit a bid indicating their maximum willingness to pay (minimum willingness to 
accept compensation in exchange for) for such a mug. After submitting their bids, subjects 
completed a survey designed to collect data on their age, gender, and income, as well as on 
their perceptions of the retail price of the mugs up for auction, and the relative difficulty of 
selling or buying the mugs outside of the experiment. Upon completion, the monitor col­
lected these surveys. 
Subjects in the Information treatment were then provided with information about the 
institutional structure of the market for mugs outside of the experiment. That information 
was as follows: 
Before we proceed to Object Round Two, I want to take a moment to inform you that the 
coffee mugs used in today's experiment were purchased at the University Book Store. 
These mugs can be returned to the bookstore for store credit, but they cannot be ex­
changed for a cash refund. This is because you will not be given a University Book Store 
sales receipt. 
Subjects in the Control treatments received no such information. 
During step five, subjects submitted a second bid indicating their maximum willing­
ness to pay (minimum willingness to accept compensation in exchange) for the mug. After 
submitting these bids, they completed a second survey similar to the first, but excluding 
questions on age, gender, and income. These surveys were collected once all subjects had 
completed them. 
In step six, the binding mug round was determined by flipping a coin. After announc­
ing the result of the coin flip, the bids from that round were ranked on the blackboard. The 
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cut-off bid was determined at random and was announced along with the cut-off price. 
Subjects were informed that if they had submitted a bid above (below) this cut-off price, they 
would purchase (sell) a mug at that price. Subjects were then paid $15 for their participation, 
and any transactions agreed to were carried out. 
At this point, I should make special note of several aspects of the study's design. 
First, the coffee mugs used in the experiment were clearly marked with a University Book 
Store price tag. In different experiments, KKT auctioned off coffee mugs with and without 
price tags and found similar results in both cases (median WTA/WTP ratios of 2.5 and 3.5, 
respectively). I chose to leave the price tags on the mugs because of the bookstore's return 
policy. As that policy was explained to me, merchandise can be returned for a full cash 
refund if it still bears its price tag and is accompanied by a receipt. Items marked with a 
price tag but not accompanied by a receipt can be exchanged for in-store credit only. Items 
lacking both a price tag and a receipt cannot be exchanged or returned. Therefore, since I 
was interested in the effect of the perceived difficulty of selling the mug (i.e., returning it to 
the bookstore), it seemed most convenient to choose the middle level (price tag, no receipt). 
In order to solicit subjects' valuations, I used a variation of the random nth-price auc­
tion mechanism developed by Shogren et al. (2001b). This mechanism can be thought of as 
a hybrid of the popular Vickrey (1961) and Becker-DeGroot-Marshak (1964) auction mecha­
nisms, drawing desirable elements from both. These auctions are widely used in the eco­
nomic literature because, in contrast to the traditional first-price sealed-bid auction, both 
Vickrey and BDM auctions are theoretically demand revealing (in a one-shot setting). 
Of these two auction mechanisms, the Vickrey auction has been more popular be­
cause it is relatively easy to explain and the market-clearing price is determined endoge-
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nously. However, there is some concern about the mechanism's ability to prompt off-margin 
bidders to reveal their true preferences (see Shogren et al. 2001b). While truth telling is 
weakly dominant for all bidders, those whose valuation is far below that of high-valuers will 
never be punished for insincere bidding. 
The BDM auction offers a solution but introduces a new problem. By randomizing 
the number of winners, the BDM auction should incent off-margin bidders to bid sincerely. 
However, this is achieved by randomly selecting the market price from some predetermined 
distribution. Thus, the market price is no longer endogenously determined, and there need 
not necessarily be a positive number of winners or losers in any given auction round. 
The random nth-price auction differs from the BDM in that while the market price, 
and thus the number of winners in any auction, is determined at random, the "distribution" 
the market price is chosen from is endogenized. Specifically, the market price is chosen at 
random from the bids submitted by market participants. In the buyer case, one of the bids 
submitted by potential buyers is chosen at random as the cut-off price. Anyone who submit­
ted a bid higher than that price buys the good at the cut-off price. Anyone who submitted a 
bid at or below the cut-off price buys nothing. Thus, by separating what subjects bid from 
what they pay if they win the auction, the random nth-price auction mechanism preserves the 
demand-revealing properties of the Vickrey auction. Shogren et al. (2001b) show that the 
random nth-price auction does in fact outperform the Vickrey auction mechanism when it 
comes to motivating off-margin bidders to bid their true valuation in an auction for induced 
value tokens.2 
2 It can be argued that the random nth-price auction mechanism's endogenous determination of market price is 
actually a weakness. For example, an altruistic potential buyer might submit a zero bid in the hope that her bid 
would be chosen as the cut-off price, thus yielding the highest possible surplus for her fellow bidders. 
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Also worth noting was a potential problem observed after the first willingness to pay 
treatment (WTP Control). In this treatment, a dozen coffee mugs were displayed at the front 
of the room, and before bidding to buy the mugs, subjects were asked to come to the front of 
the room and inspect the mugs. Although the coffee mugs were clearly marked with their 
price ($5.95), when asked what they believed the mug could be purchased for outside of the 
experiment, seven of the thirty subjects gave answers that either over- or underestimated the 
true price of the mug by more than a dollar. Further, after controlling for subjects' percep­
tions about the relative difficulties of reversal and delay, there was an alarmingly high 
correlation between the outside price reported and the subjects' bids ( / = 1.67 ). Taking these 
facts into consideration, I decided to pass the mugs around the room in the second WTP 
treatment. Subjects in that treatment were read the following paragraph as the mugs were 
passed around: 
The next two rounds will be conducted for the COFFEE MUG you have just been given. 
This coffee mug is not yours to keep, but you will be given the opportunity to buy it dur­
ing the next two auction rounds. At this time, please take a few moments to carefully ex­
amine the mug to determine whether you wish to buy it in the rounds that are about to 
take place. 
While mean WTP was higher in the second treatment, the impact was marginal (f = 1.65). 
5.2 Empirical Results from Experiment 1 
At first blush, the data are consistent with the large body of evidence suggesting that 
stated WTA for private goods is more than twice stated WTP. However, a more careful 
examination of the data shows that the perceived difficulty of selling later versus buying later 
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has a significant negative effect on potential buyers' valuation of the coffee mug. In this 
section, I begin by comparing subjects' bids with their perceptions of the relative difficulties 
of delay and reversal. I then describe the results of a series of simple regressions designed to 
test more precisely the effects these perceptions have on WTP and WTA. 
Table 5.2 presents the summary statistics from all three auction rounds, first for all 
treatments, then for WTP and WTA treatments separately. It is worth noting that while the 
ratio of both mean and median WTA to WTP are close to one for a dollar bill, there is a large 
disparity between WTA and WTP in both of the coffee mug auction rounds (( = 0.98, 7.25, 
and 6.78, respectively). 
Table 5.3 reports subjects' valuations conditional on their reported perceptions of the 
relative difficulty of reversal versus delay. As predicted by the commitment cost theory, 
buyers who perceived reversal (i.e., selling the good outside of the experiment) to be more 
difficult than delay (i.e., buying the good outside of the experiment) submitted bids signifi­
cantly lower than buyers who perceived reversal to be easier than delay ($2.26 versus $3.86, 
( = 2.15). 
The theory also predicts that the mean bid for sellers who perceive reversal (buying 
later) to be more difficult than delay (selling later) will be higher than that for sellers who 
perceive delay to be relatively more difficult. While this is the case ($5.83 versus $4.83), the 
difference between the two means is not significant at conventional levels (f =0.82). This 
lack of statistical significance may be due, in part, to the fact that only three out of the sixty 
potential sellers perceived buying later to be more difficult than selling. In Sections 5.3 and 
5.4,1 discuss an experiment where subjects are given the opportunity to delay or reverse their 
71 
Table 5.2 Mean Bids from Experiment 1 
All Treatments 
Mean Median Standard 
Deviation 
Observations 
Dollar Bill 1.00 1.00 0.34 120 
Coffee Mug (Round 1) 3.63 3.88 2.19 120 
Coffee Mug (Round 2) 3.53 4.00 2.25 120 
WTP Treatments 
Mean Median Standard 
Deviation 
Observations 
Dollar Bill 0.97 0.99 0.42 60 
Coffee Mug (Round 1) 2.42 2.00 1.75 60 
Coffee Mug (Round 2) 2.35 2.00 1.96 60 
WTA Treatments 
Mean Median Standard 
Deviation 
Observations 
Dollar Bill 1.03 1.00 0.22 60 
Coffee Mug (Round 1) 4.84 5.00 1.90 60 
Coffee Mug (Round 2) 4.72 4.88 1.87 60 
transactions within the experimental setting, thus allowing me to control the relative diffi­
culty of buying and selling later. 
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Table 5.3 The Effects of Perceived Differences in Relative Reversal and Delay Difficulty 
WTP WTA 
Perceived Relative Mean Bid Observations Mean Bid Observations 
Difficulty 
Reversal Difficulty 2.26 43 5.83 3 
> Delay Difficulty (172)" (0.29) 
Reversal Difficulty 2.26 11 4.61 12 
= Delay Difficulty (176) (133) 
Reversal Difficulty 3.86 6 4.83 45 
< Delay Difficulty (1.58) (2.08) 
1 Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
Table 5.3a The Effects of Perceived Differences in Relative Difficulties for Keepers 
WTP WTA 
Perceived Relative Mean Bid Observations Mean Bid Observations 
Difficulty 
Reversal Difficulty 2.48 34 6.00 2 
> Delay Difficulty (1.79)' (0.00) 
Reversal Difficulty 2.38 10 4.73 8 
= Delay Difficulty (1.80) (148) 
Reversal Difficulty 4.72 3 5.48 31 
< Delay Difficulty (1.03) (1.70) 
1 Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
Table 5.3b The Effects of Perceived Differences in Relative Difficulties for Non-Keepers 
WTP WTA 
Perceived Relative Mean Bid Observations Mean Bid Observations 
Difficulty 
Reversal Difficulty 1.42 9 5.50 1 
> Delay Difficulty (112/ (—) 
Reversal Difficulty 1.05 1 4.38 4 
= Delay Difficulty (—) (111) 
Reversal Difficulty 3.00 3 3.40 14 
< Delay Difficulty (1.73) (2.18f 
'Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
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Commitment cost theory further predicts that mean WTP will be less than mean 
WTA among buyers and sellers who believe that reversal is relatively more difficult than 
delay. This is strongly supported by the data ($2.26 versus $5.83, t = 3.56 ). 
Finally, the theory predicts that the mean bid submitted by potential sellers who per­
ceive delay (selling later) to be relatively difficult will, on average, be less than that submit­
ted by potential buyers who believe delay (buying later) is relatively difficult. This was not 
the case ($4.83 versus $3.86), but the difference between the two averages is not statistically 
significant (f = -1.10). This last test is particularly interesting, since this prediction is one of 
the elements that sets commitment cost apart from the endowment effect. The endowment 
effect predicts that WTA will be greater than WTP for all agents who do not simply think of 
the good as a means of exchange. The commitment cost model, on the other hand, predicts 
that WTP will actually exceed WTA if both buyers and sellers perceive delay to be more 
difficult than reversal. Given that the two means are not significantly different, I can make 
no definitive statement about which theory better describes the data. 
Table 5.3a presents figures similar to those in Table 5.3, but for the subgroup of sub­
jects who indicated they intended to keep the mug if they left the experiment with it. Like­
wise, Table 5.3b presents figures for the subgroup that indicated they intended to return or 
exchange the mug. The results in both tables are qualitatively similar to those in Table 5.3. 
This is also of interest when comparing the endowment effect and commitment cost models, 
since the endowment effect would predict no disparity between WTA and WTP for goods 
thought of as means of exchange (for example, the dollar bill used in the practice round). 
The fact that a significant disparity still existed among the 27% of subjects who intended to 
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return the mug strongly suggests that the endowment effect alone cannot explain the 
WTA/WTP ratio of 2.11 observed among the subgroup of non-keepers. 
Table 5.4 is similar to Table 5.3, but parses the data more finely. In order to make 
pair wise comparisons between this table's cells, it is necessary to first make a strong as­
sumption. Namely, that absolute difficulty scores are comparable across subjects. This 
assumes, for example, that a sell difficulty score of m reported by agents i means the same 
think as a similar score reported by agent j. This is to be contrasted with results reported in 
Table 5.3, which only rely on comparison of relative difficulty. 
Given this assumption, the commitment cost model predicts that potential buyers and 
sellers who report the same absolute scores for the difficulties of selling and buying later 
should also report similar valuations. For example, the model would predict that the mean 
bid of the eight potential sellers who reported a sell-difficulty score of 2 and a buy-difficulty 
score of 1 should not be significantly different from the mean bid of the four potential buyers 
who reported the same absolute scores. This, in fact, is not the case. Of the nine cells in 
Table 5.4 where such comparisons can meaningfully be made, in only three of them are mean 
WTA and mean WTP not significantly different. 
The commitment cost theory further predicts that WTA will exceed WTP when both 
buyers and sellers perceive the difficulty of reversal to be greater than the difficulty of delay. 
This can be interpreted as meaning that the WTA values in cells above the diagonal should 
be greater than the WTP values in corresponding cells below the diagonal (e.g., comparing 
bids submitted by sellers who reported a sell-difficulty score of 1 and a buy-difficulty score 
of 2 with bids submitted by buyers who reported a sell-difficulty score of 2 and a buy-
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Table 5.4 The Effects of Perceived Differences in Relative Reversal and Delay Difficulty 
Difficulty of Buying Later 
(WTP Delay Difficulty, WTA Reversal Difficulty) 
1 2 3 4 5 
2.31 (5)a — 4.63 (2) — — 
Difficulty of 
1 4.74 (6) 6 .00  (  1  )  
— 
Selling Later 
'J 
1.19(4) 1.28 (2) 4.00(1) 5.90(1) — 
(WTP Rever­
5 .36 (8 )  4.78 (5) 6 .00  (  1  )  — 
sal Difficulty, 
3.23 (9) 2.86 (7) 2.69 (4) 2.00 (2) — 
WTA Delay 
J  5 .51  (12 )  4 .14 (6 )  
— -
Difficulty) 2.09(11) 3.75 (2) 2.18(2) — 
4 4 .15 (11 )  6 .00 (2 )  6.75 (I) 3.00 (1) 5 .50  (  1  )  
6.80 (6) — 1.75 (2) — — 
5 4 .25  (3 )  5 .95 (1 )  — — 
'The top number in each cell is mean WTP, the bottom number is mean WTA, and the numbers 
in parentheses are the number of observations. 
difficulty score of 1). This comparison can only be made for two pairs of cells in Table 5.4, 
and it only holds true for one of them. 
Finally, the theory predicts WTP will exceed WTA when both buyers and sellers per­
ceive the difficulty of delay to be greater than the difficulty of reversal. This can be inter­
preted as meaning that the WTA values in cells below the diagonal should be less than the 
WTP values in corresponding cells above the diagonal. This comparison can be made for 
four pairs of cells, but in no case does it hold. While these comparisons do not reflect 
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favorably on the commitment cost model's predictions, they are likely less reliable than the 
relative comparisons reported in Table 5.3. 
To further assess the results, I have also performed regressions to estimate both WTP 
and WTA as functions of whether subjects intend to keep the good should they leave the 
experiment with it, and their perceptions of the relative difficulty of delay and reversal. The 
following six specifications were considered, and the results from this analysis are reported 
in Table 5.5. 
[ 1 ]  W T P t  =  P 0  +  P K e t p K e e P i ,  
[2] WTP; = PQ + Pneta,^Relative,, 
[3] WTP, = 0O + pKeepKeept + p^^Relative,, 
[4] WT4 =P0+ PKeepKeep t ,  
[5] WTA, = P0 + PRe,ativtRelative{, 
[6] WTAi = P0+ pKetpKeep{ + p^^Relative^. 
Here, the coefficient PKeep is associated with the variable Keept, a dummy variable that 
equals one for agents who report that they plan to keep the mug should they leave the ex­
periment with it. The results from specifications [1], [3], [4], and [6] all strongly support the 
idea that keepers place higher value on the mugs than do non-keepers, as the coefficient 
PKeep's significantly greater than zero in all four cases. This, however, is somewhat difficult 
to interpret. Is the value a subject puts on an item a function of whether she intends to keep 
that item, or is her decision about whether to keep the item dependent on the value she puts 
on it? 
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Table 5.5 Regression Results from the First Round of Bidding 
WTP WTA 
[I] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
1.76*** 2.91*** 2.19*** 3.72*** 5.01*** 3.92*** 
(3.67)a (7.56) (4.54) (9.24) (13.6) (8.40) 
0.84 — 0.98* 1.64*** — 1.66*** 
(1.54) (1.89) (3.38) (3.41) 
— -0.34** -0.37*** — -0.47 -0.58 
(-2.48) (-2.72) (-0.62) (-0.85) 
'Numbers in parentheses are t statistics. 
* Significant at the 0.10 level. 
** Significant at the 0.05 level. 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level. 
The coefficient PRe,ative is associated with the variable Relative; e [-1,1], which is de­
fined as the difference between subject z's perceived difficulty of selling later and her per­
ceived difficulty of buying later. That is, 
Relative, =^( SellDifficultyj - Buy Difficulty; ), (5.1) 
where both SellDifficulty, and Buy Difficulty; are self-reported measures ranging from 1 
(very easy) to 5 (almost impossible). If subject i reports that she believes that selling outside 
the experiment would be almost impossible, but that buying would be very easy, then 
Relative; = 1. On the other hand, if she reports that she believes that selling outside would 
be very easy, but that buying would be almost impossible, then Relative; = -1. A Relative; 
value of 0 would imply that she perceived buying and selling to be equally difficult. The 
estimates of PRelative reported in columns [2] and [3] of Table 5.5 are significantly less than 
zero. This suggests that potential buyers who believe selling later (reversal) will be more 
Constant 
Keep 
Relative 
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difficulty than buying later (delay) tend to bid significantly less than buyers who believe 
selling later will be relatively easy. This is consistent with the predictions of the commitment 
cost theory. The theory also predicts that potential sellers who believe selling later (delay) 
will be relatively more difficulty than buying later (reversal) will tend to bid significantly less 
than those who believe buying will be more difficult. This relationship, however, is not 
borne out by the data. While the estimates of PRetative reported in columns [5] and [6] of 
Table 5.5 are negative, they are not statistically significantly so. 
As described in Section 5.2, subjects in the WTA and WTP Information treatments 
were presented with information about the structure of the outside market between the first 
and second auction rounds for coffee mugs. The commitment cost theory predicts that if 
subjects are provided with information that changes their perceptions about the relative 
difficulty of reversal versus delay, this should in turn affect their stated valuations. 
Table 5.6 presents descriptive statistics from the second coffee mug auction. Table 
5.7 presents the relative perceptions after the second mug auction round for subjects in both 
the Control and Information treatments. The results are stark. A chi-squared test of 
independence fails to reject the null hypothesis that there is no difference between subjects' 
reported relative perceptions of difficulty in the WTP and WTA Control treatments ( %2 = 
0.35 [2]). Likewise, the test fails to reject the null comparing perception between the two 
Information treatments (%' = 0.39 [2]). However, when comparing reported relative percep­
tions across the Control and Information treatments, I can reject the null hypothesis at the 
0.0001 level in both the WTP and WTA cases ( = 23.74 [2] and 24.91 [2], respectively). 
79 
Table 5.6 Mean Bids from the Second Round of Bidding 
WTP WTA 
Control Information Control Information 
Mean 2.03 2.66 4.66 4.78 
Median 2.00 2.26 4.08 5.00 
Standard Deviation 1.71 2.16 1.68 2.08 
Observations 30 30 30 30 
Table 5.7 Second-Round Relative Perceptions in the Control and Information Treatments 
WTP WTA 
Perceived Relative Control Information Control Information 
Difficulty 
Selling Difficulty 28 10 27 8 
> Buying Difficulty 
Selling Difficulty 1 17 2 18 
= Buying Difficulty 
Selling Difficulty 1 3 1 4 
< Buying Difficulty 
Table 5.8 Second-Round Mean Bids in the Control and Information Treatments 
WTP WTA 
Perceived Relative Control Info. t statistic Control Info. t statistic 
Difficulty 
Selling Difficulty 2.11 1.74 0.55 4.79 5.39 -0.82 
> Buying Difficulty (173/ (2.12) (1.68) (2.28) 
Selling Difficulty 0.02 2.76 -1.42 3.65 4.52 -0.57 
= Buying Difficulty (—) (1.87) (1.62) (2.08) 
Selling Difficulty 2.00 5.17 -1.16 2.95 4.78 -0.85 
< Buying Difficulty (—) (2.36) (—) (1.92) 
'Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
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Clearly, the information subjects were provided with in the Information treatments had a 
highly significant effect on their perceptions of the relative difficulty of reversal versus delay. 
However, while subjects' perceptions were affected by this information, their valua­
tions were not. Table 5.8 reports mean bids for the same sub-groups reported in Table 5.7. 
In no case is the mean bid from the Control treatment significantly different than that from 
the Information treatment (/ statistics range from -1.42 to 0.55). So, while information 
significantly affected perceptions, this did not translate into the effect on stated valuations 
predicted by the commitment cost theory. 
To further test whether information has any significant impact on subjects' valua­
tions, I have performed regressions to estimate the change in both WTP and WTA from the 
first round of bidding to the second a function of whether subjects intend to keep the good 
should they leave the experiment with it, and how their perceptions of the relative difficulty 
of delay and reversal changed. The following six specifications were considered, and the 
results from this analysis are reported in Table 5.9. 
[7] AWTP; =p0+ PContro,Control;, 
[8] MVTPj =PQ+ P^^ARelative; 
[9] AWTP; = p0 + PControlControl.t + p^elatiwARelative;, 
[10] AWT A; =P0+ PConmi Control;, 
[11]  AWT A;  =p 0 + p^ e l a t i v e ARela t ive ;  
[12]  AWT A;  =  P Q  + P C a n [ r o l Contro l ;  +  p^^ARela t ive , ,  
where Control, is a dummy variable that equals one if subject i was in a Control treatment, 
and ARelative; is defined as the difference between the Relative, figure calculated from first 
Table 5.9 Regression Results from the Second Round of Bidding 
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AWTP A WTA 
[7] [8] [9] ÎÏÔ] [U] [12]— 
Constant Ô7Î2 ÔÔ7 Ô7Î3 -.0033 ÔÔ4 -0.34 
(0.60) (0.46) (0.73) (-0.01) (0.15) (-1.00) 
Control -0.11 — -0.11 -0.24 — 0.66 
(-0.37) (0.31) (0.53) (1.35) 
Change in — 0.01 -0.05 — 0.90 1.40* 
Perceptions (-0.01) (-0.09) (1.24) (1.70) 
'Numbers in parentheses are t statistics. 
* Significant at the 0.10 level. 
survey and that calculated from the second survey. The results of these regressions are 
reported in Table 5.9. In none of the four regressions is the coefficient pConlrol significantly 
different from zero. Thus, the data do not suggest that information regarding the structure of 
the outside market has any significant effect on valuation of the mug. The coefficient 
Putdanve fr°m regression [12] is positive and marginally significant, suggesting that valuation 
increased among potential sellers who decided after the first round that selling later was 
relatively easier or that buying later was relatively more difficult. 
5.3 The Design of Experiment 2 
The lack of a statistically significant relationship between perceptions and WTA bids 
in Experiment 1 may be due, in part, to the small portion of potential sellers who perceived 
buying later to be more difficult than selling (three out of sixty). Therefore, in this section I 
lay out the design of an experiment where subjects are given the ability to either delay or 
reverse transactions within the controlled environment of the experiment. 
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This test consisted of four experimental treatments—two WTP and two WTA— 
where subjects were given the chance to either buy or sell a box of cookies. The design 
differs appreciably from that of Experiment 1 in that subjects in this experiment were told 
that after the market price had been announced and transactions had been completed, they 
would be given a sample of the cookie and, depending on the treatment, given the chance to 
either buy a box from or sell their box back to the monitor at the randomly-selected market 
price. This allows me to test whether subjects consider the market's dynamic aspects when 
formulating their valuation of a good. Commitment cost theory predicts that potential buyers 
offered the opportunity for delay (but not reversal) will, on average, bid less than buyers 
offered the opportunity of reversal (but not delay). Likewise, potential sellers offered the 
opportunity for delay (but not reversal) will, on average, bid more than sellers offered the 
opportunity of reversal (but not delay). By manipulating subjects' ability to delay or reverse 
their transactions I am able to test whether the theory's predictions hold. 
In the WTP Buy Later treatment, subjects were given a sample of the cookie after the 
completion of the binding auction round. Those subjects who had not purchased a box in the 
auction were then offered the chance to buy one at the (by then known) market price. The 
WTP Sell Later treatment differed only in that after tasting the cookie, subjects who had 
bought a box in the auction round were given a chance to sell it back to the monitor. WTA 
Buy Later and Sell Later treatments were similar, except that subjects were initially endowed 
with a dollar bill and a box of cookies, then offered the chance the sell them. 
The commitment cost model predicts that if the value formulation process is dynamic, 
subjects' valuations will be affected by the relative difficulty of buying and selling the good 
in the future. More to the point, model predicts that subjects in a treatment where selling 
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later is more difficult than buying later will submit bids that are, on average, lower than the 
bids submitted by subjects in a treatment where buying is relatively more difficult. 
The four treatments were conducted over the course of one day in order to minimize 
discussion among potential subjects outside of the experiment. Subjects for this study were 
recruited from Principles of Economics courses at Iowa State University during the spring 
semester of2002. Further, subjects for Experiment 2 were recruited from different Principles 
sections than were the subjects for Experiment 1. In other words, no student was invited to 
participate in both Experiments 1 and 2. Between twenty-seven and thirty students partici­
pated in each of the four experimental treatments, for a total of 114 subjects. Each subject 
was paid $10 for participating. A summary of subjects' socioeconomic characteristics can be 
found in Table 5.10. These numbers seem reasonable considering the population from which 
the subjects were drawn. Age, gender, and income do not vary significantly across the WTA 
and WTP treatments, nor do age and income differ across the two experiments. Experiment 
2 differs from Experiment 1 in that women are not significantly underrepresented. 
Each of the four experimental treatments had six steps. (1) Subjects were read an in­
troduction to the experiment and an explanation of the BDM auction mechanism. (2) Sub­
jects took part in a non-binding auction for a dollar bill. (3) The monitor explained that the 
next auction would be for a box of Petit Écolier cookies, and that it would necessarily be 
binding. (4) Subjects inspected the box of cookies, submitted bids indicating either WTP or 
WTA, depending on the treatment, and completed a perceptions survey. (5) The predeter­
mined, randomly selected market price was announced, and any transactions agreed to were 
carried out. (6) All subjects were given a sample cookie, and, depending on the treatment, 
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Table 5.10 Characteristics of Subjects in Experiment 2 
All Treatments WTP Treatments WTA Treatments 
(w = 114) (/i = 57) (n = 57) 
Mean 
(Std Dev) 
Median Mean 
(Std Dev) 
Median Mean 
(Std Dev) 
Median 
Age 19.7 19.0 19.8 19.0 19.5 19.0 
(1.49) (1.38) (1.60) 
Female 0.48 0.00 0.42 0.00 0.54 1.00 
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50) 
Income 6000 4000 6491 4000 5491 4500 
(7123) (8287) (5707) 
were given the chance to buy a box or sell their box back at the market price. Appendix F 
contains the actual instructions given to subjects in the WTA Sell Later treatment. 
During the first step, subjects read along as the monitor read the experiment's instruc­
tions aloud. These instructions contained both a brief introduction to experiment, as well as a 
detailed description of the workings of the BDM auction. The monitor went over an example 
auction on the blackboard and administered a short quiz to test subjects' understanding of the 
auction format. 
The second step was a non-binding practice auction for a dollar bill. This round was 
intended to further familiarize subjects with the auction mechanism. The monitor announced 
that the market price had been drawn from a continuous uniform distribution over the [0,5] 
interval. Depending on whether subjects had been assigned the role of buyers or sellers, they 
submitted bids to either buy or sell a dollar bill. These bids were collected and ranked on the 
blackboard. The predetermined, randomly selected market price was announced, and sub­
jects were informed that, had this been a real round, anyone who submitted a bid at or above 
(below) the market price would buy (sell) a dollar bill. 
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During step three, the monitor informed subjects that the following auction round 
would be for a box of cookies and that the auction would be binding. The monitor further 
explained that after the bids had been submitted and the market price announced, subjects 
would be given a sample cookie. In the WTA and WTP Sell Later treatments, the monitor 
explained that anyone in possession of a box of cookies after the auction would be offered 
the chance to sell it back to the monitor at the market price after tasting a sample. Likewise, 
in the WTA and WTP Buy Later treatments, the monitor explained that anyone not in posses­
sion of a box of cookies after the auction would be offered the chance to buy a box from the 
monitor at the market price after tasting a sample. The monitor also explained that these 
sorts of transactions would incur a "cost of waiting." This cost varied from individual to 
individual and could equal either 00 or 500. 
In step four, subjects were given the chance to inspect the box of cookies being auc­
tioned off, the monitor announced that the market price would be drawn from a continuous 
uniform distribution over the [0,10] interval, and the subjects submitted bids indicating their 
maximum willingness to pay (minimum willingness to accept compensation) for such a box. 
After submitting their bids, subjects completed a survey designed to collect data on their age, 
gender, and income, as well as on their perceptions regarding the retail price of the cookies, 
and the relative difficulty of selling or buying the cookies outside of the experiment. Upon 
completion, the surveys were collected. 
During step five, the predetermined, randomly selected market price was announced, 
and any transactions agreed to were carried out. 
In step six, all subjects were given a sample cookie, and, depending on the treatment, 
were given the chance to either buy or sell a box at the market price. 
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At this point, I should make special note of several of the study's key aspects. In or­
der to have better control over the difficulty of reversal and delay, I felt it was necessary to 
choose a good that would be difficult for subjects to purchase or sell outside of the experi­
ment. The good I eventually chose was a 150g box of French-labeled Petit Écolier cookies 
purchased in France. This particular type of cookie cannot be purchased in the Ames area, 
and the market for selling the cookies outside the experiment is likely thin, if not completely 
nonexistent. 
I chose to use the BDM auction mechanism instead of the random nth-price mecha­
nism used in Experiment 1 due concerns about the demand-revealing nature of the random 
nth-price auction in this particular context. Had the nth-price auction been used, a subject 
may have had the incentive to misrepresent in the first period in the hope that her bid would 
be chosen as the market price for which she could buy or sell in the second period. Using the 
BDM auction eliminates this incentive, since the market price is determined at random. 
Finally, the prices used in the practice and real auction rounds were drawn in advance 
at random using a pseudo-random number generator. The same numbers were used in all 
four treatments so that any effects the prices may have had on later behavior would be 
consistent across treatments. The price used in the practice rounds was $2.26, and the price 
used in the real rounds was $8.87. 
5.4 Empirical Results 2 
Table 5.11 presents the summary statistics from both auction rounds, first for the 
combined treatments, then for WTP and WTA treatments separately. The theory of com­
mitment cost predicts that the mean bid submitted by potential sellers in the WTA Sell Later 
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Table 5.11 Mean Bids from Experiment 2 
All Treatments 
Observations Mean Median 
Dollar Bill 114 1.01 1.00 0.32 
Cookies 114 2.59 2.05 1.97 
Cookies 57 2.40 2.00 1.97 
(Sell Later) 
Cookies 57 2.78 2.65 1.97 
(Buy Later) 
WTP Treatments 
Observations Mean Median Standard 
Deviation 
Dollar Bill 57 1.01 0.99 0.47 
Cookies 57 3.08 3.00 2.25 
Cookies 27 3.36 3.25 2.30 
(Sell Later) 
Cookies 30 2.83 2.75 2.21 
(Buy Later) 
WTA Treatments 
Observations Mean Median Standard 
Deviation 
57 1.01 1.00 0.19 
57 2.12 2.00 1.53 
30 1.56 1.63 1.12 
27 2.73 2.50 1.70 
Standard 
Deviation 
Dollar Bui 
Cookies 
Cookies 
(Sell Later) 
Cookies 
(Buy Later) 
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treatment should be greater than the mean bid submitted by potential buyers in the WTP Buy 
Later treatment, because reversal is more difficult than delay in both treatments. This was 
not the case ($1.56 versus $2.83). In fact, mean WTA was significantly less than mean WTP 
(f = -2.81 ). This is in conflict with the predictions of both the commitment cost and en­
dowment effect models. 
Further, contrary to the predictions of the endowment effect, the commitment cost 
model predicts that when the difficulty of delay is greater than the difficulty of reversal, the 
mean bid of potential buyers should be greater than that of potential sellers. Thus, commit­
ment cost would predict that the mean in the WTP Sell Later treatment should be greater than 
meant in the WTA Buy Later treatment. While this was the case ($3.36 versus $2.73), the 
difference was not statistically significant (z = 1.14 ). 
The theory also predicts that among potential buyers, those who were offered the op­
portunity to delay purchasing will bid lower than those offered the opportunity to reverse 
their purchase should they win the auction. This was true ($2.83 versus $3.36), but, again, 
the difference was not statistically significant (t = 0.89 ). 
Similarly, commitment cost predicts that among potential sellers, those offered the 
option of delaying the transaction will submit bids greater than will potential sellers given the 
option to reverse a sale should they win the auction. Not only was this not the case ($1.56 
versus $2.73), but the mean bid in the WTA Sell Later treatment was significantly less than 
in the WTA Buy Later treatment (f = -3.10). 
Further, while mean WTA equals mean WTP for a dollar bill, mean WTA is signifi­
cantly less than mean WTP for the box of cookies ($2.12 versus $3.08, t = -2.00 ). This 
clearly runs contrary the predictions of the endowment effect model. It is worth noticing that 
89 
all of the results that run contrary to the predictions of the commitment cost theory involve 
the WTA Potential Delay treatment. 
In Table 5.12, subjects' valuations are broken down based on their reported percep­
tions of the relative difficulty of buying or selling the good outside the experiment. Com­
mitment cost theory predicts that bids submitted by buyers who perceive reversal (i.e., selling 
the good outside of the experiment) to be more difficult than delay (buying the good outside 
of the experiment) will, on average, be less than those submitted by sellers who also believe 
reversal (buying later) is more difficult than delay (selling later). This is not supported by the 
data($2.77 versus $2.11, t = -1.00). 
In line with the predictions of the theory, buyers who perceived the difficulty of re­
versal (selling later) to be greater than the difficulty of delay (buying later) submitted bids 
lower than buyers who perceived reversal to be easier than delay ($2.77 versus $3.44). This 
difference, however, was not statistically significant (t = 0.97 ). 
The theory also predicts that the mean of the bids submitted by sellers who perceive 
reversal (buying later) to be more difficult than delay (selling later) will be greater than the 
mean of the bids submitted by sellers who perceive delay to be relatively more difficult. As 
can be seen in Table 5.12, this prediction is not supported by the data ($2.11 versus $2.39, 
/ = -0.41). 
Finally, the theory predicts that, in the absence of the endowment effect, sellers who 
perceive delay (selling later) to be relatively difficult will bid less, on average, than buyers 
who perceive delay (buying later) to be relatively difficult. This was in fact the case, and the 
difference in means is significant at the 0.10 level ($2.39 versus $3.44, t = 1.90 ). 
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Table 5.12 The Effects of Perceived Differences in Relative Reversal and Delay Difficulty 
WTP WTA 
Perceived Relative Mean Bid Observations Mean Bid Observations 
Difficulty 
Reversal Difficulty 2.77 31 2.11 15 
> Delay Difficulty (2.33)' (1.46) 
Reversal Difficulty 3.50 10 1.58 14 
= Delay Difficulty (2.59) (1.27) 
Reversal Difficulty 3.44 15 2.39 28 
< Delay Difficulty (1.87) (1.65) 
a Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
To further investigate the results, I have performed the following regressions to esti­
mate WTP and WTA as functions of subjects' perceptions of the relative difficulty of delay 
versus reversal and whether they face a cost when reversing or delaying a transaction within 
the experiment: 
[13] WTP; = PQ  + PG^RELATIVE;,  
[14] WTP*l =p 0  + PC^Cost; + PRe,a,^Relative;, 
[15]  WTP; S L  =P q + Pc^Cos t ;  +  P R e l a l t v t Rela t ive ; ,  
[16] WTA, = A + PREIA,^RELATIVE;, 
[17] WTA?1 = P0+ PCouCostj + Ptteia,^Relative;, 
[18]  WTAf L  =p 0 + P C o u Cost ;  +  P R e l a l i KRela t ive ; ,  
where WTP; represents bids from the combined WTP treatments, WTP;BL represents bids 
from the WTP Buy Later treatment, and WTPFL represents bids from the WTP Potential 
Reversal treatment. Likewise, WTA, represents bids from the combined WTA treatments, 
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WTAf1 represents bids from the WTA Buy Later treatment, and WTA?1 represents bids from 
the WTA Sell Later treatment. The results of these specifications are reported in Table 5.13. 
As in Experiment 1, the variable Relativee [0,1] is defined as the ratio of subject z's 
perceived difficulty of selling later over her perceived difficulty of buying later. That is, 
Relative; = ( SellDifficulty, - Buy Difficulty; ), (5.2) 
where both SellDifficulty; and BuyDifficulty{ are self-reported measures ranging from 1 
(very easy) to 5 (almost impossible). Cost; is a dummy variable that equals one for subjects 
facing a 500 cost of waiting, and zero for agents with no waiting cost. 
The estimates of PRelative reported in Table 5.13 are not significantly different from 
zero. This does not support the theory that buyers (sellers) who perceive reversal to be 
relatively more difficult than delay will submit lower (higher) bids than will buyers (sellers) 
who perceive delay to be more difficult. 
Likewise, the coefficient pcgst is not significantly different from zero in any of the 
four regressions for which it was calculated. Thus, the results do not support the theory that 
imposing a cost on selling (buying) later will tend to decrease (increase) subjects' bids in the 
auction round. 
I should note that the four treatments were performed at noon, 1:00 pm, 2:00 pm, and 
3:00 pm. The WTA Sell Later treatment, in particular, was conducted at 1:00 pm. If some of 
the subjects in that treatment had just had lunch, it is possible that that could have negatively 
affected their valuation of food products, which may, in part, explain why the mean bid from 
the WTA Sell Later treatment is significantly less than those from the other three treatments. 
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Table 5.13 Regression Results 
WTP WTA 
[13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] 
Constant 3.27*** 3.25*** 4.00*** 2.07*** 1.83*** 2.52*** 
(10.2)a (5.11) (6.03) (9.90) (6.35) (5-16) 
Relative -1.13 -1.36 -1.05 0.63 0.55 0.83 
(-153) (-124) (-0.99) (1.02) (0.86) (0.80) 
Cost — -0.42 -0.89 — -0.60 0.28 
(-0.50) (-0.99) (-1.42) (0.41) 
a Numbers in parentheses are t statistics. 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level. 
5.5 Conclusions 
In the absence of unusually large income effects, Hicksian utility theory predicts that 
WTP and WTA should differ by only a small margin (Willig; Randall and Stoll). However, 
this prediction is at odds with the preponderance of data from the fields of both environ­
mental and experimental economics. While the observed disparity between WTA and WTP 
clearly poses a problem for those two fields, it also poses a problem for the larger economic 
profession, as it may indicate a flaw in the Hicksian approach that forms the basis of con­
sumer theory. A number of theories have been proposed to explain the disparity, making use 
of both behavioral and neoclassical arguments. Most recently, Zhao and Kling have pro­
posed an approach that takes into account the dynamic nature of the decision making process, 
and recognizes that there are option values associated both with going ahead with a transac­
tion and with delaying it. 
In this chapter, I have discussed two economic experiments designed to test whether 
subjects' valuations are affected by their perceptions of the market's dynamic aspects, and 
whether those effects, if they exist, contribute to WTA-WTP disparity. The results from the 
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first experiment suggest that potential buyers do take into account dynamic considerations 
when formulating their stated willingness to pay for a private good. And while the same 
cannot be said for potential sellers, deviation of just one of the two value measures from the 
underlying Hicksian variations is enough to cause disparity between WTA and WTP. 
However, while commitment costs do seem to arise in an experimental setting, my results do 
not suggest that subjects' perceptions are such that these commitment costs can explain the 
WTA-WTP disparity observed in the experimental literature. 
In the second experimental test, I offered subjects the opportunity for future learning 
while varying the cost of the reversal and delay options. By manipulating the relative 
difficulty of delay versus reversal between treatments, I hoped to gain better understanding of 
the role dynamic considerations play in the formation of stated value measures. The results, 
however, are difficult to interpret. In particular, the fact that mean WTA is significantly less 
than mean WTP suggests either a flaw in the experimental design or that offering subjects the 
potential for delay or reversal changes their value formulation process in a manner that is 
inconsistent with current theories. I feel that the most likely explanation is that the experi­
mental market was too complicated. Subjects were bidding on an unfamiliar good in an 
unfamiliar auction, and were then offered the chance to either reverse or delay the transaction 
through unfamiliar means. Were the market somehow simplified, or were subjects to gain 
more market experience, it is possible the results would be more consistent with theory. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSIONS 
In this dissertation, I have examined whether dynamic elements of the decision proc­
ess affect value estimates in settings traditionally viewed as static. Further, I have tested 
whether the effects of those dynamic elements are consistent with Zhao and Kling's theory of 
commitment cost. My results suggest that willingness to pay estimates elicited using the 
contingent valuation method include a significant dynamic component. However, my results 
provide only limited evidence that WTP and WTA estimates elicited in an experimental 
setting include dynamic components. 
In the CVM case, respondents offered the opportunity to delay their purchasing deci­
sions until more information became available were willing to pay significantly less for 
improved water quality than those who were told they would have only one chance to 
respond to such a survey. The difference was stark. In some cases, dynamic WTP was less 
than half static WTP. Not only are differences of this magnitude highly significant, but they 
also have serious implications for the design of stated preference surveys. If welfare analysts 
do not take care to accurately represent the potential for future learning, they risk dramati­
cally misstating willingness to pay. If uncertainty, irreversibility, and the potential for 
learning are inherent to the policy under consideration, then commitment cost is relevant to 
the eventual policy decision, and stated preference questions should be written to reflect the 
dynamic nature of the valuation problem. However, if the conditions necessary for the 
existence of commitment cost are not met, then it is equally important that survey respon­
dents be informed that they are facing a static decision. 
The recent efforts of the Friend's of Hallett's Quarry, and Ames-area interest group, 
offer an interesting example of the implications dynamic considerations can have on public 
policy. The group recognized that the 245-acre Hallett's Quarry site, a unique ecological and 
recreational resource, was facing imminent and irreversible commercial development, and 
that the City of Ames' option to purchase the site would soon expire. Under these circum­
stances, the decision of whether to preserve the area could not be delayed. Unless the static 
nature of the decision was made clear to area residents, their valuations may have errone­
ously included commitment costs. Therefore, in the weeks leading up to the November 6, 
2001 bond-issue referendum that would determine whether the City could raise the funds 
needed to purchase the quarry, the interest group used a series of local newspaper advertise­
ments and public forums to make it clear to Ames residents that the referendum represented 
their last chance to preserve the site before the City's option to purchase expired. A copy of 
one of those advertisements can be found in Appendix G. Note that it makes explicit refer­
ence to the static nature of the decision problem. The referendum went on to pass with an 
86% majority. 
The results of the economic experiments reported in Chapter 5 are less persuasive. 
While in the first of the two tests I find statistically significant evidence that subjects con­
sider dynamic aspects when formulating WTP values, the same cannot be said for respon­
dents formulating WTA values. Further, my results do not support the commitment cost 
theory's prediction that changes in subjects' perceptions regarding the relative difficulty of 
delay and reversal should affect their WTA or WTP values. While I show that providing 
subjects with information about the their ability to reverse or delay a transaction outside of 
the experiment has a significant effect on their beliefs about the relative difficulty of the two, 
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this change in beliefs does not have a significant impact on reported WTP or WTA. Finally, 
in order for the theory to be able to reconcile the WTA-WTP disparity with neoclassical 
consumer theory, it is necessary that, on average, both buyers and sellers perceive the diffi­
culty of reversal to be greater than the difficulty of delay. I do not find evidence that this is 
the case. Therefore, my results do not suggest that dynamic components in stated preference 
measures contribute to the WTA-WTP disparity. 
The results from the second experimental test are more puzzling. By varying the rela­
tive difficulty of delay and reversal across treatments, I hoped to gain a better understanding 
of how a market's dynamic aspects affect the formation of stated preference measures. To do 
this, I offered subjects the opportunity for future learning and varied the cost of reversal and 
delay options. Not only are my results inconsistent with the predictions of the commitment 
cost model, they are also inconsistent with the predictions of the endowment effect. In 
particular, the fact that mean WTA was actually significantly less than mean WTP either 
suggests a flaw in the experimental design or that offering subjects the potential for delay or 
reversal changes their value formulation process in way that current theories cannot explain. 
Experiment 2's curious results should not be allowed to overshadow the findings 
from Experiment 1. The most interesting of Experiment l's results is that potential buyers' 
willingness to pay was significantly affected by their perceptions regarding the relative 
difficulty of outside reversal and delay. This has important implications for the design of 
experimental auctions for unfamiliar goods. Auctions conducted in an experimental setting 
are often the most convenient means for estimating consumers' willingness to pay for new 
products or product traits. For example, experimental auctions have been used to estimate 
consumers' valuation of new packaging techniques (Hoffman et al. 1993), irradiated meat 
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(Hayes et al. 1995), and food products containing genetically modified ingredients (Rousu et 
al. 2002). While experimental auctions are typically thought of as taking place in a static 
market, uncertainty and the potential for delay and subsequent future learning are inherent 
and inescapable aspects of such markets. My results suggest that, in such an environment, 
subjects' bids are likely to contain a significant dynamic component. If that is the case, 
researchers are not estimating expected value (which, presumably, is what they are after), but 
expected value minus an option value associated with delay and learning. The commitment 
cost model predicts that the effect of this option value could be lessened both by reducing 
subjects' uncertainty and by offering them the opportunity for reversal. 
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in order to make intelligent division» concerning die future 
of Clear Lake, it is important to undentand how the lake it-
aelf is used, ai well a# bow this we would be aficcted by pos*-
bk changes in the quality of the lake. The answen you give to 
the questions in this survey are very important in this process. 
Please try to answer each of the questions below finally 
please keep in mind that, whenever we refer to Ckar Lake, we 
are referring to the lake hsdf, not the town. 
IN THIS SURVEY WE WILL ASK YOU SOME QUESTIONS ABOUT 
potential changes lo the water quality of Clear Lake during the coming yean. 
Fir*, however, wc will give you some information on the current condition of the 
lake. Re aie read thii information carefully before answering the questions that 
follow. 
Cleer Lake's 
Currant Condition 
The quality of a lake cam be rirsrrihrd in many wsyi. Oee meaaure of 
water quality ia the clarity of the khe water. Water clarity is ueuaBy de-
•ajbed in lams of how for down iato the water an otgect is viable. The 
clarity of Oear Lake at the present time is about one-half to oat foot 
Thia means that otyects are only vUble down to about one foot under 
the surihoa of dw water. The avasaga water darity of Char Lake in 
1953 was about en feet 
Another meaiuie of water quality ietke amount of nutrients and 
other substances contained in the water. Water quelty depadadon can 
result font a number of aouicee, indudfag runoff from die suraunding 
community containing fctdfaen used for lawn care and from local agit 
cultural sources. Cumndy these nutrients contribute to the occumace 
of algae bloom ia the lake, usualy 10 to 12 times per year. Under some 
drcuestaeoes, the* blooms can be a health ooBoero, cauamg *in 
rsshm and aDergic reactions. In the past, concerns about bacteria pre­
sent in Clear lake have rtaukrdia beach dosing* 
He overall quality ofthe water can has* an impact on other condi-
done of the lake, door wnter quality results in an undemUc color and 
odor to the lake water. Cuncnlly, the color ofGkar Lake varies be­
tween bright green and brown. The water has a mid odor that many 
describe as "fcfay," with occasional periods of strong odor. 
finally, the quality of Ike «mler ieopneb the variety sad quantity of 
fob in the lake. Cunendy, Oear lake hmakege quantity of wefleye, but 
the largest ptrcentsfn of the Bd) rsii^ M in the lake see fob that are con­
sidered somewhat kas dessable. The chart kxficate* the type offish that 
Ar» 
have been eaiq t^ In the lake over die past year. WhSe 
the rats at which firii art caught wrist finm yaar to year 
and from seaecn to seanm, the typical «ne* rate has been 
I fth ewny 2 houis of fohiDg during die peak fldrfog 
i(MayrodJiee). 
Ejçeits believe that improved water quality would 
not dptfeandy increase the number of U in Cfear 
Lake, but would Increase the variety of Ash qiedes 
caught, im&idinghass, perch, muskle,and pik 
10 to U per year 
IN THE NEXT FEW QUESTIONS, WE WILL BE ASKING YOU 
how you would vote on â special ballot regarding the water quality of Clear 
Lake. While there ii currently no such ballot being considered, vie would like 
you to respond «/you were voting on the project and, in each care, as if it 
were the tuff project available. Please answer the questions in order and do not 
go back and revise your earlier answers. 
When you think about your answer, it's important to keep in mind that 
people tend to be more generous when payments are hypothetical than when 
they are real. The idea is that it is very easy for people to say that they are in fa­
vor of improving the lake when ihey know no real money will ever change 
hands. However, if the propoeed payments arc real, people might be more in­
clined to think about their other options and how they would otherwise spend 
that money. So in answering the foltowing questions, please heep in mind both 
the benefits from maintaining Ckar Lake's water quality and the impact that 
passage of the referendum would have on your own pocketbook. In other 
words, please answer «s j/ït were a real referendum, 
Finally, I he following questions a* you to consider making hypothetical 
payments. You might think of this payment as taking the form of higher state 
or local taxes. With this in mind, please answer the questions as carefully and 
hociesdy as possible. 
!+S 
Plan A 
If nothing is done to improve the water quality of the lake it is likely to 
deteriorate over the neat decade. Suppose that the deteriorated conditions 
at Ckar lake would be as Mows: 
Water darky ejects ristkigtrfthahh I inch to 5 
indheemdarwaw 
Algae Wooms mitant 
Water color fluofeaocntpeea 
Water odor ahityssfroog 
M low divunty, mostly rough &h 
Further, suppose the Iowa Department of Natural Resources (DNR) devel­
oped a program that would avoid this deterioration and instead maintain the 
current coodmoos of the lake. 
1. Would you vote "ye»" on a rcftrrndum that would aéftthc pro-
poaed program (in which case water quality would not deteriorate 
as described under ÏUe A), but «ait you 190 (paid over five yean at 
$18 per year)? 
a NO 
a YES 
2. To help u« better understand your mnmm n, please indicate the mngle 
most important reason far your lesposwe to the preceding question: 
• The DNR program would not be a good uaeofmy money. 
• The DNR program would be a good use of my money. 
• The pian is mot realistic or » undear. 
• It is not appropriate tourne a referendum like this one to determine 
water quality. 
• I already contribute to environmental causes as much as lean aSord. 
• No one should have the right to damage the lake m the fiist place. 
• 1 do not support tax intwaaes under any cbcumstances. 
• Other 
i+t 
Plan B 
Now suppose the DNR has developed a program that would actually im­
prove the «pialhy of Clear Lake. Tha program might indwlc mahliihing 
protectiooitripiBlongtheedgeofthelake to reduce runoff from the sur­
rounding area or other structural changes to the lake. 
HICK changes would awoid further deterioration to the lake and, in fact, 
improve the lake over the next five to ten yean to the fallowing mndirinni: 
Wamrdarity objects distinfiishahla 2 to 4 feet 
underwater 
%ebbon 6 to 8 per year 
Water color green to brow* 
W« 
M low dwmÉty, good walleye 
S. Would you vote "yes" on e referendum that would aAp the proposed 
program but «a* you $610 (paid over five yean at |162 per year)? 
Q NO 
Q YES 
4. To hdp us better understand your answers, please indicate ihe single 
mo* important reason far your response to the preceding question 
• The DNR program would not be a good use of my money. 
• The DNR program would be a good we of my saooey. 
• Hie plan ii not realistic or is undear. 
Q h is not appropriate to use a referendum like this one to determine 
water quality. 
• I already contribute to environmental causes ai much as I can afford. 
• No one should have the right to damage the lake m the fint place. 
• I do not support tax inatsses under any drcumstmnrrs 
• Other 
V» 
Plan C 
Now suppose that additional investments could be made such that conditions at 
Clear Lake would improve even further. These changes could include retimç some 
land from agricultural use, and programs to control nutrient runoff Bom urban and 
agricultural land*. 
Suppose these changes would avoid further deterioration at the lake and, in fact, im­
prove the lake over the next ten to twenty yean lo the following conditions: 
Water darity objecte dbtagiiidiahlr 6 to 8 feet 
Algae blooms 3 lo 4 per year 
Water color pernio blue 
Water odor oocarional mild 
ftartlMr, asppoietWiiufvcyicpreKn» «be StMe'aoaly dance mguhcr faribnna-
don about «Âatkiad of taluapoflpl* pat on Char Uha. lime mpoadis if this wHI 
bcyourfaaloppo*pasitytovo*contyii»oc,*SKilhalifthcfaI«riagrrfc»ndi«n 
Mb lop—.thcrBwfflbcBohaHcpwgt—i»teinywm am»rqaakya*Ckarlakc. 
3. Would you vote "ye*" on m rrfrimdum «bat would aiqt the proposed 
program but «•* you 11*10 foaid owe1 five ytazial|282 per year)? 
a NO 
• YES 
6. To hdp us better understand your www, plsaic indicate the single 
mo* iaqxxtantreaaonfcr your reiponelo the precedug question: 
• The DNR program would not be a good use of my money. 
• The DNR propmm would be a good use of my money. 
• The plan i* not reafabc or i* undear. 
• Itisaots|jpiijpiiaie tome a referendum hhe thi* one to determine 
water quality. 
• Iabrady contribute to environmental causes a* much as lean afibrd. 
• Nooneshouldhsve the right lo damage the lake ia the first place. 
• I do not support tax increases under any drcumftances. 
• Other 
JV" 
IN Tins SECTION, WE WOUIJ) IJKE TO ASK YOU ABOUT YOUR 
opinion* regarding which lake characteristic* arc important to you and your 
views regarding some specific proposals to change Clear Lake. 
7. Asmme you have a total of 100 importance points to a*gn to the 
lake characteristics below. Please indicate the importance of each 
item by allocating your 100 point* among the item* en thaï*. To 
indicate one hem is more important in you than another, you should 
allocate more point* to it You do not need to give points to all of the 
items, but remember that the total needs to equal 100. 
Water duity 
Hard, dean, «ndy lake bottom in 
minsninoarcas I 1 3 
Diversity of witllfl sen at Char Uke 
Diversity of Mi yedes/habstal 
Quantity aHhh caught 
Safety from bacteria contaoina-
tion/heahh advisories 
T#W 1M 
8. In order to improve water quality in the lake, changes in land uae m 
die watenhed nay be needed. For cample, M likely that aarae 
land will weed to be changed to low impact me, Ifwich change» oc-
cur, which of the following land uaet do you favor? Plea* check al 
that apply. 
fans* '***« - - lew** Seen* 
hifclandi a • • a a 
AddWooal CooMnatko 
Kaenc Vlravam aocaae a a a a a 
Eenoiedwwdandt • • • a a 
biwidpiUe a a a a a 
Rmoiul wedantb a a a a a 
Nature amcroation area a a • • a 
Constructed ponds a • a a a 
Bnndagicsenm a a • a a 
Rartond riparian aonea a a • a a 
Perennial Agriculture • • a a a 
Other a a a a a 
i !  
9. A number of project» have beat «uggeted to fmmplwli improve 
ment» m the lake. How do you feel about the Mowing poa'hiTitirt? 
Swan Swwi Neeeel 
n Ommc 
Increased paifc lamb 
and recreational area» a • a a a 
Building of a nature 
center or envwonmcntal 
paifc 
a a a a a 
Purchase of easements 
for bribing buffer «ripe a a a a a 
Increased land idling a a a a a 
Restoration of Ventura 
Manhtoenprowe 
nutrient retention 
a • a a a 
Non-motor boat dayi a • a a a 
Increased no-wake a a a a a 
Limiting motor hone-
power a a a • a 
Lake MtmdÊy rende 
tionicortsdential 
development 
a a a • a 
Repair of Komi drains a a a • a 
10. Thinking about the pen year, while you were visting Clear Lake, 
what percentage of your tine did you ipead: 
Artlihj ftmif 
FUfag % 
Sailing % 
Beocatianal boating (water ding, power 
boding, jet éiing, etc.) % 
Swinuaing/bcadiuse % 
Nan#espprsdatiom/w*wiag % 
Snuwmnlaling and odwr winter itwabon % 
Camping % 
FlcakUag % 
Other % 
100% 
INFORMATION ON YOU AND OTHER MEMBERS OF YOUR 
household will help us better understand how household characteristics affect 
an individual's use of and attitudes toward Clear Lake. It will abo help us to 
determine how representative our sample is of the state of Iowa. All of your an­
swers are strictly confidential. The information will only be used to report 
comparisons among groups of people. We will never identify individuals or 
households with their responses. Please be a complete as possible. Thank you. 
II. Are you 
• male • female 
12. What is your age? 
Q Under 18 
• IB-25 
O 26-34 
• 35-49 
050-59 
060-75 
Q 76 + 
J*/J 
13. What it the highest level af schooling that you have completed? 
(Please check only one) 
Q Eight yean or less 
Q Some high school or less 
Q High school graduate 
Q Some college or trade/vocational school 
Q Two yean of college or trade/vocational school 
Q College graduate 
• Some graduate school 
0 Advanced degree 
14. How many adtilts live in your household (ower the age of 18)? _ 
15. How many children hive in your household (18 or under)? 
To help us better understand how you value your leisure time, we would 
Hke to ask you about your work choices. 
16. If you are currently employed, how many hours a week do you typi­
cally wort? 
17. If you are cunendy employed, do you have the option of wotting ad-
dhionalhoun to increase your total income? 
• No 
O Yes—if so, what would your hourly wage be? 
I per hour 
18. Ifyou answered "no" to question 17, and you could have the option 
ofwoitingmoreor less houn, which would you prefer? 
• Work mote hours 
Q We* las hours 
19. What was your tool household income (befcte Uses) in 1999? 
Q Under 110,000 
• 110,000-114,999 
• 115,000-119,999 
• 120,000-124,999 
• 125,000-129,999 
a ISO,00043*,999 
Q $15,000-189,999 
• $40,000449,999 
• $50,000459,999 
Q $60,000474,999 
• $75,000-199,999 
• HOOjOOO-1124^99 
a $125,0004149,999 
a Over $150,000 
20. Do you awn your home? 
• No 
• Yes 
21. Aie you s year-round resident? 
• No 
• Yes 
*9» 
P A. lease fed free to make any additional comments about your answers to 
these questions or about the survey itself. Thank you fer your niainrr with 
our Clear Lake Survey. 
Comments: 
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Water clarity 
Algae blooms 
Water color 
Water odor 
Bacteria 
Fish 
APPENDIX B LOW VARIANCE GRAPHIC 
Plan C 
objects distinguishable 6 to 8 feet 
under water 
3 to 4 per year 
green to blue 
occasional mild 
infrequent swim advisories 
high diversity 
general water color 
visible bottom 
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APPENDIX C HIGH VARIANCE GRAPHIC 
Plan G 
Water clarity objects distinguishable 2 to 12 feet 
under water 
Algae blooms 0 to 8 per year 
Water color greenish brown to blue 
Water odor occasional mild to no odor 
Bacteria infrequent swim advisories to no 
advisories 
Fish low to high diversity 
,general water color. 
yi-isibU bottom  ^
Greatest possible 
affect of Plan C 
Least possible 
affect of Plan C 
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APPENDIX D THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN a AND p 
P Value Estimate of a 
Basic Preferences 
Estimate of a 
Heterogeneous Preferences 
1.0 0.987 0.963 
0.9 0.986 0.961 
0.8 0.985 0.960 
0.7 0.984 0.958 
0.6 0.983 0.956 
0.5 0.982 0.953 
0.4 0.981 0.950 
0.3 0.980 0.951 
0.2 0.978 0.948 
0.1 0.976 0.945 
0.0 0.974 0.937 
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APPENDIX E INSTRUCTIONS FROM EXPERIMENT 1 
General Instructions 
Welcome and thank you for choosing to participate in this experiment. Today you will be 
taking part in a series of auctions. These auctions are being conducted as part of a research 
project funded by Iowa State University. For showing up to the experiment you have already 
earned $15. This show-up fee will be paid to you at the end of the experiment, though the 
amount will be adjusted to reflect any purchases that you make. Any items that are in your 
possession at the end of the experiment will be yours to keep. 
Attached to the top of this page is a yellow piece of paper with a number on it. This is your 
Claim Check. Each participant has a different number. We use claim checks to maintain 
anonymity. At the end of the experiment, you will need your claim check to collect your 
earnings. Please remove your claim check now and put it in a safe place. 
In the auction rounds to be conducted today, you will be given the chance to buy different 
items. In each case, you will be asked to indicate the maximum dollar amount you are 
willing to pay for these items. 
It is important that you follow directions carefully. Do not turn pages or open envelopes 
until instructed to do so. You should not talk to or try to communicate with the other 
participants in the room. If you have a question, please raise your hand and the monitor will 
come to where you are seated. 
I l l  
Today we will be using what is known as a cut-off price auction. Each auction round will have five 
steps: 
Step 1 Examining the items 
The monitor will describe the item being auctioned off during that round, and you 
will be given a chance to examine it. 
Step 2 Submitting a bid 
You submit a bid indicating the maximum price you would be willing to pay for 
one unit of the item being auctioned off. You will submit your bid by writing the 
amount on the bid form provided. 
Step 3 The monitor ranks the bids from highest to lowest 
Rank-ordered bids: #1 $A.AA highest bid S
#2 SB.BB 
#3 SC.CC 
#4 SX YZ 
#5 SD.DD 
Step 4 Determining the cut-off price 
The monitor determines the cut-offprice by randomly selecting a cut-off bid. 
There is an equal chance that the cut-off bid will be the 2nd, 3rd, 4th,..., or nth 
highest bid, where n is the number of different bids submitted in that round. In 
the above example there are five different bids, so it is equally likely that the cut­
off bid will be the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, or 5th highest bid. The cut-off price is equal to 
the cut-off bid. For example, if the monitor randomly selected bid #4 as the cut­
off bid, the cut-off price would be $X.YZ since that was the 4th highest bid 
submitted. 
#1 SA.AA 
#2 SB.BB 
#3 SC.CC 
Cut-off bid #4 $X.YZ 
#5 SD.DD 
Step 5 Determining who wins the auction 
highest bid 
lowest bid 
Each person who bid above the cut-off price wins the auction and buys one unit 
of the item at the cut-off price. In our example, the three highest bidders (#1, #2, 
and #3) would each buy one unit and would each pay SX YZ Anyone who 
submitted a bid at or below the cut-off price would not buy anything. In our 
example, the two lowest bidders (#4 and #5) would not buy anything. Notice that 
there can be more than one winner in any auction round, but that the person who 
submits the cut-off bid does not win the auction. 
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A simple example will help to clarify things. Suppose ten people (Person A, Person B, Person C,, 
Person J) are bidding to buy some item (say, front row tickets to next season's Iowa-Iowa State 
football game). Their bids are as follows: 
Person A—$24.50 
Person B—$98.00 
Person C—$250.00 
Person D—$12.80 
Person E—$50.00 
Person F—$9.99 
Person G—$67.00 
Person H—$34.50 
Person I—$ 1.42 
Person J—$10.00 
The monitor collects these bids and ranks them from highest to lowest: 
Rank-ordered bids: #1 Person C—$250.00 highest bid 
#2 Person B—$98.00 
#3 Person G—$67.00 
#4 Person E—$50.00 
#5 Person H—$34.50 
#6 Person A—$24.50 
#7 Person D—$ 12.80 
#8 Person J—$10.00 
#9 Person F—$9.99 
#10 Person I—$1.42 lowest bid 
Since there were ten different bids submitted, the monitor randomly selects a number between 2 and 
10 to determine the cut-off bid. Suppose the monitor selects the number 8. That means bid #8, the 
eighth highest, is the cut-off bid. Since bid #8 is $10.00, that becomes the cut-off price. Anyone who 
bid more than $10.00 buys a ticket for $10.00. Anyone who bid $10.00 or less does not buy anything. 
Notice that Person J does not buy a ticket. 
In this type of auction it is always in your best interest to bid exactly what the item being auctioned 
off is worth to you. You do not want to bid more than what the item is worth to you because the cut­
off price might turn out to be more than you are willing to pay. What is less obvious is that you do 
not gain by bidding less than the maximum you are willing to pay for the item. This is because the 
winners do not pay the amount that they bid, but instead pay the cut-off bid. 
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Claim Check Number 
Short Quiz 
Please complete the following quiz to make sure that you understand the auction format we will be 
using. When everyone has finished, the monitor will collect the quiz and explain the answers. 
1 ) The winner of an auction purchases an item and will always have to pay what he or she bid. 
a) True 
b) False 
2) If you have the third highest bid and the randomly selected cut-off bid is the eighth highest, you 
win the auction. 
a) True 
b) False 
3) You might pay less than the amount you bid, but you will never pay more than your bid. 
a) True 
b) False 
4) If the randomly selected cut-off bid is the eighth highest, how many people win the item? 
a) 6 
b) 7 
c) 8 
d) 9 
5) It is in your best interest to bid the maximum amount you are truly willing to pay for the item 
being auctioned off. 
a) True 
b) False 
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Practice Round Instructions 
In this round you will be given the chance to buy a DOLLAR BILL. This round is simply for 
practice. None of the transactions from this round will actually be carried out. It is simply intended 
to familiarize you with the auction procedure we will be using in the later rounds. 
To illustrate how this round will work, suppose the cut-off price is 90C. Were this a real round and 
you had submitted a bid of more than 90c, you would buy a dollar bill for 90c and take it home with 
you at the end of the experiment, earning a profit of 10c. If you had submitted a bid of 90c or less, 
you would not spend any money and you would not buy a dollar bill. 
Again, this first round is only for practice. No money will actually change hands, and no one will 
actually buy a dollar bill. 
In a moment, I will ask you to submit a bid indicating the maximum price you would be 
willing to pay for a dollar bill. 
I will collect those bids, rank them from highest to lowest, and randomly select a cut-off bid 
in order to determine the cut-off price. Were this a real round, anyone who submitted a bid 
that was higher than the cut-off price would receive a dollar bill and would pay the cut-off 
price. 
Notice the following two things: (1) Your bid can have no effect on the price you will pay if 
you win the auction. (2) It is in your best interest to bid your true value. 
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Object Round Instructions 
The next two rounds will be conducted for the COFFEE MUG you have just been given. 
This coffee mug is not yours to keep, but you will be given the opportunity to buy it during 
the next two auction rounds. At this time, please take a few moments to carefully examine 
the mug to determine whether you wish to buy it in the rounds that are about to take place. 
The auction for mugs will be repeated twice, but only the exchanges from one of the two 
rounds will actually be carried out. That is, you will write down your bid for one coffee 
mug, the monitor will collect everyone's bid forms, and then the auction will be repeated. 
When both rounds have been completed, the monitor will flip a coin to determine which 
round will be implemented, and the cut-off price for that round will be randomly selected. 
Only the transactions from that round will be carried out. Because you do not know which 
round will be chosen, it is in your best interest to bid your true value in both rounds. 
For example, if the second of these two rounds is selected as the one to be carried out, the 
monitor would rank the bids from that round, randomly select the cut-off bid in order to 
determine the cut-off price. If your second-round bid was higher than that price, you would 
have to pay the cut-off price and you would receive a mug to take home. In this example, 
none of the trades from the first round for mugs would be carried out. 
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Object Round One 
You do not own the COFFEE MUG in front of you, but you have the option of buying one to 
take home by paying money for it. 
In a moment, I will ask you to submit a bid indicating the maximum dollar amount you 
would be willing to pay for a coffee mug. 
I will collect these bids, and if this round is determined to be the one whose transactions are 
carried out, I will rank the bids from highest to lowest, and randomly select a cut-off bid in 
order to determine the cut-off price. Anyone who has submitted a bid higher than that price 
will pay the cut-off price and be given a mug to take home. 
Notice the following two things: (1) Your bid can have no effect on the price you will pay if 
you win the auction. (2) It is in your best interest to bid your true value. 
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Claim Check Number 
Survey 
1) Gender: • Female • Male 
2) Age: 
3) What is your approximate yearly income from all sources, before taxes? $ 
4) What do you think would be the price of the ISU coffee mug if you were to buy one outside of 
this experiment? 
$ 
5) If you win the auction: 
A) What do you plan to do with the mug? 
• Keep it 
• Return or exchange it 
B) On the following scale of 1 to 5, how easy do you think it would be to return or exchange 
the mug? Please answer this question even if you plan to keep the mug. 
(very easy) 1 2 3 4 5 (almost impossible) 
C) Thinking about your bid in the previous round, if you were to try to return or exchange 
the mug, which of the following do you think is true? Again, please answer this question 
even if you plan to keep the mug. 
• You could earn a profit 
• You could break even 
Q You could take a loss 
6) If you do not win the auction: 
A) On the following scale of I to 5, how easy do you think it would be to obtain the mug (or 
a close substitute) later? 
(very easy) 1 2 3 4 5 (almost impossible) 
B) If you were to purchase the mug (or a close substitute) later, which of the following do 
you think is true? The purchase price would be... 
• more than your bid in the previous round 
• about the same as your bid in the previous round 
• less than your bid in the previous round 
7) If you were to try to return a mug to the University Book Store, what, if anything, do you think 
you could exchange it for? 
• Can't return 
• Store credit 
• Cash 
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Before we proceed to Object Round Two, I want to take a moment to inform you that the 
coffee mugs used in today's experiment were purchased at the University Book Store. These 
mugs can be returned to the bookstore for store credit, but they cannot be exchanged for a 
cash refund. This is because you will not be given a University Book Store sales receipt. 
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Object Round Two 
You do not own the COFFEE MUG in front of you, but you have the option of buying one to 
take home by paying money for it. 
In a moment, I will ask you to submit a bid indicating the maximum dollar amount you 
would be willing to pay for a coffee mug. 
I will collect these bids, and if this round is determined to be the one whose transactions are 
carried out, I will rank the bids from highest to lowest, and randomly select a cut-off bid in 
order to determine the cut-off price. Anyone who has submitted a bid higher than the cut-off 
price will pay the cut-off price and be given a mug to take home. 
Notice the following two things: (1) Your bid can have no effect on the price you will pay if 
you win the auction. (2) It is in your best interest to bid your true value. 
120 
Claim Check Number 
Survey Two 
1 ) What do you think would be the price of the ISU coffee mug if you were to buy one outside of 
this experiment? 
$ 
2) If you win the auction: 
A) What do you plan to do with the mug? 
• Keep it 
• Return or exchange it 
B) On the following scale of I to 5, how easy do you think it would be to return or exchange 
the mug? Please answer this question even if you plan to keep the mug. 
(very easy) 1 2 3 4 5 (almost impossible) 
C) Thinking about your bid in the previous round, if you were to try to return or exchange 
the mug, which of the following do you think is true? Again, please answer this question 
even if you plan to keep the mug. 
• You could earn a profit 
• You could break even 
• You could take a loss 
3) If you do not win the auction: 
A) On the following scale of 1 to 5, how easy do you think it would be to obtain the mug (or 
a close substitute) later? 
(very easy) 1 2 3 4 5 (almost impossible) 
B) If you were to purchase the mug (or a close substitute) later, which of the following do 
you think is true? The purchase price would be... 
• more than your bid in the previous round 
• about the same as your bid in the previous round 
• less than your bid in the previous round 
4) If you were to try to return a mug to the University Book Store, what, if anything, do you think 
you could exchange it for? 
• Can't return 
• Store credit 
• Cash 
121 
APPENDIX F INSTRUCTIONS FROM EXPERIMENT 2 
General Instructions 
Welcome and thank you for choosing to participate in this experiment. Today you will be 
taking part in a series of auctions. These auctions are being conducted as part of a research 
project funded by Iowa State University. For showing up to the experiment you have already 
earned $10. This show-up fee is yours to keep. Any items that are in your possession at the 
end of this experiment will also be yours to keep. 
Attached to the top of this page is a yellow piece of paper with a number on it. This is your 
Claim Check. Each participant has a different number. We use claim checks to maintain 
anonymity. Please remove your claim check now and put it in a safe place. 
In the auction rounds to be conducted today, you will be given different items and then 
offered the chance to sell them to the monitor. In each case, you will be asked to indicate the 
minimum price at which you are willing to sell these items. 
It is important that you follow directions carefully. Do not turn pages or open envelopes 
until instructed to do so. You should not talk to or try to communicate with the other 
participants in the room. If you have a question, please raise your hand and one of the 
monitors will come to where you are seated. 
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Today we will be using what we will call a random price auction. Each auction round will have four 
steps: 
Step 1 Examining the item 
The monitors will distribute the item being auctioned off during that round, and 
you will be given a chance to examine it. 
Step 2 Submitting a bid 
You submit a bid indicating the minimum price at which you would be willing to 
sell your item. You will submit your bid by writing that amount on the bid form 
provided. 
Step 3 Announcing the market price 
The market price has been determined at random using a computer. After the 
bids have been collected, the monitor will open a sealed envelope containing the 
market price, and will announce that price. 
Step 4 Determining who wins the auction 
Each person who submitted a bid at or below the market price wins the auction 
and sells their item at the market price. Anyone who submitted a bid above the 
market price does not sell anything. Notice that there can be more than one 
winner in any auction round. 
A simple example will help to clarify things. Suppose ten people (Person A, Person B, Person C,..., 
Person J) are bidding to sell some item that each of them already owns (say, front row tickets to next 
season's Iowa-Iowa State football game). Their bids are as follows: 
Person A—$24.50 
Person B—$98.00 
Person C—$250.00 
Person D—$12.80 
Person E—$50.00 
Person F—$1.42 
Person G—$67.00 
Person H—$34.50 
Person I—$9.99 
Person J—$10.00 
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After collecting the bids, the monitor announces the random market price (which has been determined 
in advance using a computer). Suppose, for example, that the market price turns out to be $52.80. 
Anyone who submitted a bid of $52.80 or less would sell their ticket for $52.80. Anyone who 
submitted a bid of more than $52.80 would not sell anything. 
As you can see from the rank-ordered bids below. Persons I, F, J, D, A, H, and E all win the auction 
and sell their ticket for $52.80. Persons G, B, and C do not sell anything. 
Rank-ordered bids: Person I—$1.42 lowest bid 
Person F—$9.99 
Person J—$10.00 
Person D—$12.80 
Person A—$24.50 
Person H—$34.50 
Person E—$50.00 
Person G—$67.00 
Person B—$98.00 
Person C—$250.00 highest bid 
In this type of auction it is always in your best interest to bid exactly what the item being auctioned 
off is worth to you. You do not want to bid less than what the item is worth to you because the 
market price might turn out to be less than you are willing to accept in exchange for the item. What 
may not be so obvious is that you do not gain by bidding more than what the item is worth to you. 
This is because the winners are not paid the amount that they bid, but instead are paid the 
predetermined market price. 
For example, think about Person E. Suppose the football ticket is truly worth $50.00 to Person E. In 
the example we have just discussed. Person E sells her ticket for $52.80, and in a sense earns a profit 
of $2.80. But what if instead of bidding her true value, she bid something more than that, say, 
$55.00? Then instead of selling her ticket for $52.80 and earning a profit, she does not sell anything. 
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Claim Check Number 
Short Quiz 
Please complete the following quiz to make sure that you understand the auction format we will be 
using. When everyone has finished, the monitors will collect the quiz and explain the answers. 
I ) The winner of an auction sells an item and will always be paid what he or she bid. 
a) True 
b) False 
2) If the randomly determined market price turns out to be more than what you bid, you win the 
auction. 
a) True 
b) False 
3) If you win the auction, you might be paid more than the amount you bid but you would never be 
paid less than your bid. 
a) True 
b) False 
4) It is in your best interest to bid the minimum amount you are truly willing to accept in exchange 
for the item being auctioned off. 
a) True 
b) False 
5) Suppose four people are bidding to sell some item. Their bids are $0.00, $5.00, $10.00, and 
$15.00. If the market price turns out to be $6.28, how many people win the auction? 
a) 1 
b) 2 
c) 3 
d) 4 
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Practice Round Instructions 
In this round you will be given the chance to sell the DOLLAR BILL you have just been given. This 
is simply for practice. None of the transactions from this round will actually be carried out. It is 
simply intended to familiarize you with the auction procedure we will be using. 
To illustrate how this round will work, suppose the market price is 90c Were this a real round and 
you had submitted a bid of 90c or less, you would sell your dollar bill for 90c, suffering a loss of 10c 
If you had submitted a bid of more than 90c, you would get to keep your dollar bill. 
Now suppose the market price is $1.10. Were this a real round and you had submitted a bid of $1.10 
or less, you would sell your dollar bill for $1.10, earning a profit of 10c If you had submitted a bid 
of more than $1.10, you would get to keep your dollar bill. 
Again, this first round is only for practice. No money will actually change hands, and no one will 
actually sell their dollar bill. 
In a moment, I will ask you to submit a bid indicating the minimum price at which you 
would be willing to sell the dollar bill you have been given. 
The monitors will collect those bids, and I will then announce the predetermined market 
price. This price is somewhere between $0.00 and $5.00, and has been determined at random 
using a computer. Were this a real round, anyone who submitted a bid at or below the 
market price would sell their dollar bill and would be paid the market price. 
Notice the following two things: (1) Your bid cannot affect the price you will be paid if you 
win the auction. (2) It is in your best interest to bid your true value. 
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Real Round Instructions 
The next round will be conducted for the BOX OF COOKIES you have just been given. 
These cookies are yours to keep, but you will be given the opportunity to sell them during the 
next auction round. Please take a few moments to carefully examine the box of cookies to 
determine whether you wish to sell it in the auction that is about to take place. 
To the best of our knowledge, this particular type of cookie is not available in the Ames area. 
The only chance you will have to sell or buy it will be during today's experiment. 
After this auction, you will be given a small sample of the cookie. If you did not sell your 
box of cookies during the auction, you can return it to the monitor for a refund after having 
tasted a sample. The refund you will receive will be equal to the market price minus your 
cost of waiting. You can find your cost of waiting on the brown form with the words "Cost 
of Waiting" in the upper left corner. This option will only be available to those who do not 
sell their box of cookies during the auction. Those who do sell their box of cookies will not 
be given the chance to buy a new one after having tasted a sample. 
You now have and own a box of cookies. You also have the option of selling it and 
receiving money for it. 
In a moment, I will ask you to submit a bid indicating the minimum price at which you 
would be willing to sell your box of cookies. 
The monitors will collect those bids, and I will then announce the predetermined market 
price. This price is somewhere between $0.00 and $10.00, and has been determined at 
random using a computer. Anyone who has submitted a bid at or below the market price will 
sell their box of cookies and be paid the market price. 
Notice the following two things: (1) Your bid cannot affect the price you will be paid if you 
win the auction. (2) It is in your best interest to bid your true value. 
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Claim Check Number 
Survey 
1) Gender: • Female • Male 
2) Age: 
3) What is your approximate yearly income from all sources, before taxes? $ 
4) What do you think would be the price of the box of cookies if you were to buy it outside 
of this experiment? 
$ 
5) If you sell your box of cookies in the auction: 
A) On the following scale of I to 5, how easy do you think it would be to obtain 
these cookies (or a close substitute) outside of this experiment? 
(very easy) 1 2 3 4 5 (almost impossible) 
B) If you were to purchase these cookies (or a close substitute) outside of this 
experiment, which of the following do you think is true? The purchase price 
would be... 
• more than your bid in the previous round 
• about the same as your bid in the previous round 
• less than your bid in the previous round 
6) If you do not sell your box of cookies in the auction: 
A) On the following scale of 1 to 5, how easy do you think it would be to return or 
exchange the box of cookies outside of this experiment? Please answer this 
question even if you plan to keep the cookies. 
(very easy) 1 2 3 4 5 (almost impossible) 
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